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TOWARD A POSITIVE ATTITUDE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Jake Garn
United States Senator

It is a risky business committing to print any substantial comments about the course and conduct of American foreign policy in the middle of the 1970's. It is not just that our policy is "psychedelic," to use the *Wall Street Journal*'s description, or that it is too complex to deal with, though 20th century international politics is certainly complex. The real reason for the risk is that the international situation is shifting so rapidly, and the focus of international attention is shifting so rapidly, that topical comments about one aspect or another of policy, or about one area or another of the world run a tremendous risk of being outdated before the ink has dried. If one comments about Angola, there is a good chance that by the time the article appears, the world will have forgotten Angola, as it appears to have forgotten Cambodia.

Nonetheless, I would like to make some topical comments on foreign policy in this article, because it appears to me that there are some truths about our international relations that need to be articulated. For some years American foreign policy has been carried on at a level of abstraction far removed from the understanding of the average citizen of this country. Such a practice has been common in the history of the world. In the U.S., however, any serious lack of understanding of foreign policy, or serious misunderstanding of it, greatly weakens that policy. That is so because of the popular nature of our government. To an extent not generally true, the government of the United States remains a government of the people, responsive to its wishes. While no one doubts that those wishes are subject to manipulation, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain a policy which does not have broad support among the people as a whole.

Vietnam provides the classic examples of this truth. As support for the war declined among the people generally, it became harder and harder for American Presidents to extract from the Congress the money to pay for it. In the end, of course, it became impossible, and about a year ago, the effort was abandoned.

It is my view that the loss of support for our efforts in Vietnam is a specific example of a broad loss of support for our foreign policy which has re-

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sulted from a failure on the part of our leaders to explain our aims and policies in terms which the average American can understand. Foreign policy has been carried on by intellectuals of some distinction, men capable of accommodating intellectually the contradictions inherent in the policy called, until recently, "detente," but the average American is not capable of such accommodations. Policies built on them appear to him to be irrational, contradictory, self-defeating, and, finally, "psychedelic." In a sense, the loss of support feeds on itself: the less the people understand what is going on, the less they support it, and the more our leaders feel compelled to expand the number of contradictions embraced by our policies. A further loss of understanding results, and so on, until we reach the present situation, where our foreign policy appears paralyzed by the events of the day.

In this article, I would like to outline two attitudes towards America and her place in the world, and try to analyze two current international situations in terms of these attitudes. I will try to suggest the differences in outcome that would result from policies guided by one attitude as opposed to the other. In making this analysis, I hope it is not necessary to remind my readers that I am not an expert in foreign policy. I am trying to look at foreign policy in the way my constituents do. We are just ordinary citizens, who have to support American foreign policy with our money, and in some cases, our lives. We recognize the importance of international relations, and we struggle to make some sense out of them. We can be informed, and we can be led. In my experience, it is very hard to drive us.

The Negative Attitude

The first of the two attitudes is an attitude of pessimism towards the future of mankind, and about the West in particular. It is an attitude that sees a decline in will on the part of the West, and a reluctance to challenge the East for supremacy, and which therefore urges political accommodation with the leaders of the Eastern bloc. It sees the political, social and economic institutions of the West as in disarray, and sees no chance of changing the direction of the trend. Its goal in foreign policy is to arrange as smooth a period of decline as possible, keeping the retreat orderly, and making the best negotiated settlement possible.

The Positive Attitude

The second attitude is more optimistic, though not without concern for

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the real problems faced by our institutions. The most important contrast with the first attitude is its belief that the issue is not yet decided. Those viewing the world with a positive attitude see the West in trouble, suffering pangs of self-doubt, but feel that leadership and will can change the situation. They believe that there is latent in Western Man a reservoir of strength that can be called forth; that he is willing to make sacrifices if he can be shown a good reason for doing so. They are willing to speak directly about the strengths and weaknesses of all sides of international conflicts, and rely less heavily on traditional diplomatic forms.

Panama

The position of the United States in Central and South America has declined radically in recent years. No doubt we were never loved by the Latin Americans, but there was a time when we wielded considerable influence, and when American power and will merited respect. The respect was always tinged with envy, but we were at the least credited with knowing our minds, and acting in our own self-interest.

As an official position, that respect has all but disappeared from Latin America, though I believe it persists among many ordinary citizens of Latin American countries. The erratic and uncertain nature of American foreign policy actions in recent years has encouraged open criticism by countries which used to be among the friendliest. The situation in Panama, where the U.S. presence is significant, provides an international crisis which can be examined in light of the two different attitudes I have described above.

Looking at Panama negatively, it is clear that the Canal Zone was obtained under fraudulent conditions, that it is maintained to the political and economic disadvantage of the nation of Panama, and that while loss of control over the Canal would be inconvenient to the Unites States, such a loss would not devastate our strategic position in the world. Further, this attitude tells us that the forces of nationalism and anti-colonialism are, in the long run, irresistible, especially when they are backed up by military support and political encouragement provided by the Soviet Union, either directly or through such client nations as Cuba. Militarily, the Canal is indefensible, and any defense would never be tolerated by the American people. Therefore, this attitude tells us, it is essential that we reach an accommodation with the government of Omar Torrijos, an accommodation designed to preserve the most vital of our interests until some point in the distant, but easily foreseeable future, but an accommodation which admits the error in our po-

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sition, and solidifies the validity of the position taken by Panama.

Looked at with the positive attitude, the situation is quite different. This attitude is prepared to admit that the origins of our involvement in what is now the Canal Zone were not the most regular. That is not the same thing as admitting the Panamanian claims. For one thing, the Zone was obtained from Panama only after Panama itself was created, more or less openly, by the United States out of Colombian territory. In this interpretation, the United States supported the right of self-determination of a given people, and then dealt with the new nation created. Since then, the United States has operated the canal it built in the interests of all nations, including Panama, which has benefited the most by our presence here. Construction and operation of the Canal constitute services we rendered, and continue to render, to the rest of the world, for which we get little thanks.

This attitude holds that the continued American presence in the Zone is vital to our national security, and in the interests of the Panamanians themselves. Indeed it goes so far as to hold that the Zone is American territory "as much as Alaska is." It recognizes that there is legal debate over the documents surrounding the questions of ownership and sovereignty, but feels instinctively that where there is a doubt, American rights ought to be maintained.

This viewpoint does not rule out any change in the status quo. It recognizes a need to improve access of native Panamanians to the Canal Zone, and the need for economic development other than the Canal in other parts of the Zone, developments in which Panamanians ought to share. In fact, it sees little likelihood of such development if the Americans are pushed out of the zone.

Southern Africa

Similarly, the situation in post-Angola Africa can be viewed from either of the two attitudes, and a very different picture emerges, depending on which one is used. From the negative standpoint, the American people would never tolerate the introduction of American troops into Africa under any circumstances, and the interests that we have involved there are not sufficient to justify the expenditure of any significant amount of money. We do have sufficient interests to attempt to influence the outcome of events, particularly when the Soviet Union is involved on the other side. Our interests are limited, however, to forestalling any overt Communist takeover of countries which are now not formally aligned. There is no question of inter-

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vening to produce a shift in orientation towards the West.

This attitude recognizes the latent antipathy towards the United States, and other Western nations, as antipathy that has a racial origin awakened by the colonial experience. Though the United States had no African colonies, it is the paradigm of Western capitalism, and is besides the location of the single largest concentration of blacks of African origin. Further, the United States has had an ambivalent attitude towards Rhodesia and South Africa, contributing to the mistrust in which we are held by most of Black Africa. The negative attitude sees this orientation as virtually unchangeable, and seeks only to mitigate its worst effects in terms of international alignment.

With respect to the white minority governments in Southern Africa, the negative attitude views them as morally unjustified and virtually indefensible over the medium to long run. These governments will be unable to resist the pressures from the surrounding black regimes, especially in view of Communist support in the international community and military support in place. The negative attitude does not confuse the governmental forms in most black Africa with "democracy." In this respect it is not the same as the "Liberal Attitude," which could be the subject of another article. But it can not find any defense against the call for majority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa.

Those who hold the negative attitude tend to be somewhat defensive about the success of American economic policy, especially when it is compared with the poverty in the rest of the world. The defensiveness translates into a feeling of obligation for the rest of the world, resulting in programs of economic aid and assistance for development. The success of these programs is measured in dollars distributed, not in terms of strength infused into local economies. As a rule, loans are not repaid, and grants are wasted.

The goal of this attitude is to satisfy what it regards as legitimate claims against the white governments in Rhodesia and South Africa. It supports the elimination of colonial ties between African nations and European powers in an attempt to forestall Communist penetration of the continent by the Soviet Union or other Communist power.

Again, the positive attitude produces a different picture. While both attitudes have an appreciation of the strategic importance of Southern Africa, the positive attitude produces a firmer resolve to take direct and open action to protect that strategic interest. It recognizes the existing problems with the white minority governments of Rhodesia and South Africa, but is not nearly as sure that it can prescribe remedies for them, particularly in the short run.

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It is not as impressed by black agitation for "majority rule" in those countries, in view of the reality of black minority government in most of the rest of the continent.

More generally, the positive attitude sees the faults that exist in all the African nations, and the hypocrisy of those who undertake to lecture the West on democracy from positions of almost unmitigated autocracy and totalitarianism. This attitude feels no guilt in observing American successes in the economic sphere, and attributes these successes to the political and economic freedom enjoyed by the United States, and to a great extent, by the other nations of the West. This attitude is not shy at urging on the nations of Black Africa a movement towards the forms of political and economic freedom common in the West, as a long-term solution to the problems of the Third World nations.

It is the goal of this attitude to exert a positive influence in Africa through realistic interpretation of the situation and truthful analysis of the problems. This realism, coupled with firm and forthright leadership on the issues, will, according to those who have this attitude, produce a real and permanent barrier to Communist penetration, and a general improvement in the political, social and material well-being of the people of the entire continent. The goal is not to produce governmental forms identical to those of the United States. It is the substance and not the procedure that is at issue.

The Failure of American Foreign Policy

At this point, it should be apparent that the attitude which currently prevails in United States' foreign policy is the negative attitude. The identification is not complete, and it is true that American foreign policy is not monolithic. It is made up of strands developed in the White House, in the State Department, on Capitol Hill, and in the media centers of the East Coast. It is also influenced by academia, especially by the larger, more "Liberal" universities, which tend to be listened to by influential government officials. Indeed, there exists considerable sharing of personnel between and among these various institutions. The people as a whole contribute to foreign policy as well, but being a mass, their views are not as easily definable, and they are not, consequently, articulated as clearly as they should be.

In my view, the failure of the negative attitude in foreign policy cannot be denied. The situations in Panama and in Southern Africa would have to

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be listed as among the most unsatisfactory that could possibly exist in the modern world. We are suffering repeated real and propaganda losses, with no prospects for any real gains to come out of them. Our influence is being eroded and the influence of the Soviet Union is growing. I would like to suggest some reasons for this failure in policy, and consider what impact a shift to the positive attitude might have in general and specifically in these two areas.

I would argue that all of the reasons for the failure are psychological. To say that is not to say that the actual condition of the military forces of the United States and our possible opponents is not important. Obviously, it is. But I would argue that far more important than the actual number and quality of the armed forces and weapons systems is the will behind the military, that decides where, when and how they will be used. It does no good to have in place an enormous military machine if everyone knows that it will never be set in motion. Indeed, I suspect that part of the pressure coming from some of our American Liberals for a decrease in military expenditures stems from a recognition of this truth. They have simply decided that since we will never act, there is no point in keeping up the pretense, which is expensive. The psychological explanations for our failures start with the goals of foreign policy. The negative attitude provides a strictly limited goal and no real expectation of success. In fact, success is defined as a prolongation or postponement of an inevitable defeat. More importantly, the negative attitude provides no rallying point around which support can be mobilized. The trumpet, to use Biblical terminology, is giving an uncertain sound, and none prepares himself for battle. Thus the people of the country as a whole can not be mobilized in support of the policies. As a whole, the American people do not support the current negotiations on the Panama Canal; nor do they support the kind of negotiated settlement that was proposed in Angola; I seriously doubt that, today, they have much enthusiasm for our stated policy towards the black nationalist movements in Southern Africa, or that they agree with the characterization of the Rhodesian and South African governments on which our policy in that area is based.

Not only does such a policy not provide a rallying point for our own people, but it is a policy calculated to discourage any tendency other nations might have to join with us in the goals of our policy, if not in the specific means we use. As an instance, there is considerable evidence that several South American nations mistrust General Omar Torrijos of Panama. It is in the interest of these nations to keep the Panama Canal open and operating on a reasonable basis. Turning control of the Canal Zone over to Torrijos

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means increased Cuban and ultimately Soviet influence there, introducing a degree of uncertainty which is unsettling. The interest of these nations ran along with ours, and as long as the United States policy was open, direct and self-confident, tacit recognition of the status quo served the interests of these nations.

Consider now the impact that a shift in attitude might have on Panama. The situation is complicated because the negotiations are already underway, and an agreement in principle has already been reached. It is always more difficult to reverse a policy of this type than it would have been to start it right at the outset. Nonetheless, we are faced with a situation which cannot turn out satisfactorily to all parties. On the one hand, a radical faction of the local Panamanian population will not be happy until the United States has left the Canal Zone entirely, and total control of the Canal is in Panamanian hands. On the other hand, a significant portion of the American public, probably amounting to a majority, regards the Zone as American territory, bought and paid for, and will visit political retribution on any President or Congress giving up, or even appearing to give it up.

Under the circumstances, no conceivable treaty could satisfy both sides. No doubt there are "moderates" in both countries who could agree on some new treaty, but neither extreme faction would be satisfied. As the debate is presently formulated then, there is no solution. In my view, a shift to a positive attitude in foreign policy does offer a way out, though in the final analysis, the extremists in Panama will still not be satisfied.

A positive approach would call for a clear and unequivocal statement that the United States intends to retain control over the Canal. At the same time, the advantages of continued American control should be made plain through the diplomatic and media channels available to us. Further, we should announce our intention to increase economic development in the Zone around the Canal, and provide for increased Panamanian participation in such development. The artificial barriers between the Panamanian and American populations should be lowered. Most importantly, the support of other nations with an important stake in free and orderly management of the Canal should be solicited. No doubt any such solicitation will fall on deaf ears at the beginning, but it is my belief that as we continue to treat the Latin American countries in an open and forthright manner, offering our assistance not in charity, but in partnership, respect will return, and support will be implicit if not expressed.

In negotiations of this kind, questions of "world opinion" and "gunboat diplomacy" are often raised. In my view, however, nations which give

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serious attention to such charges are nations suffering from self-doubt, nations with only a slight chance of emerging from any international conflict victorious. No doubtful country has any reason, under the circumstances, to align itself with us, openly or tacitly. In my experience, "world opinion" is a fickle critic, and follows, so to speak, the election returns.

Our position in Africa could be similarly improved by an exercise of the will and a shift in attitude. Consider this as a possible explanation for events in Angola: The U.S. initially supported the anti-Communist faction of Holden Roberto in a real but clandestine fashion. Through the CIA, we channeled about $30 M in arms and assistance, but more importantly, placed our moral pressure squarely in opposition to Soviet expansionist aims in Africa. Our efforts were initially paralleled by the actions of a number of African governments. For instance, Kenneth Kaunda, the President of Zambia, was quoted by C.L. Sulzberger to the effect that Soviet intervention in Angola was nothing more than imperalism, and that if certain African nations or factions wanted to ask the U.S. for assistance, he had no objection. Kaunda even excused the South African presence in Southern Angola as an "effect of the problem, not a cause."

At that point, U.S. leadership, if not unequivocal, had at the least been present. Its basic weakness was that it was secret. Of course, in one sense, such secrecy contributes to the success of operations of this kind. What Kaunda may be willing to do in private, that is, acquiesce in South African intervention in Angola, he may not be able, politically, to do openly. Indeed, interviews with Kaunda and other African leaders indicated considerable touchiness about the South African movement. They clearly recognized the South African interest in a stable Angola, had no fears of South African "colonization," and yet recognized that they could not withstand criticisms of being too supportive of a white minority government.

The possibility of secret diplomacy was undercut at that point by two factors: the intelligence investigations on-going in Washington, and the refusal of key Senators to go along with continued covert funding. Of course, once the idea of funding the operation was made public, it was a simple matter of orchestrate the kind of outcry and opposition which assured the defeat of the project.

But even before the Congressional defeat, it was possible to perceive another serious weakness in the covert nature of the Angolan operation. It became apparent to some of us in the Senate that however difficult open support for one of the Angolan factions might be, it was infinitely more desirable than continued covert operations, leading to the conclusion desired

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by Secretary of State Kissinger.

The reason for this statement is made clear by Kissinger's own description of the goals of the U.S. in Angola. In a press conference in Washington in December, Mr. Kissinger gave our goals not as the production of an anti-communist or stable non-communist regime in Angola. "Our whole strategy was to produce a negotiated solution . . ." In other words, what the secretary covered up was the essential deficiency of our policy.

Secretary Kissinger was trying to justify the expenditure of $50 M of American money to produce the same kind of solution in Angola that we saw in Vietnam. It was for that reason that I joined in the vote for the Tunney amendment, prohibiting further aid to Angola. My reasoning was that if that was the kind of agreement we were going to get for our money, we could get it cheaper than Kissinger's price.

Be that as it may, when the African nations saw the American reluctance to support anti-communism in an open way, the ultimate victor in Angola was no longer in doubt; Cuban soldiers backed by Soviet arms and money would easily carry the day for the Neto faction, and the publicly expressed opinion of African leaders turned against the U.S., and more critical notice was taken of South African presence in Angola.

In these terms, the actual victory was determined by psychological factors. The failure of will by the United States produced a victory by default for the Soviets. The significance of the event was not lost on Henry Kissinger, but he seems to be unable to find a way to mobilize the American will to prevent the further crises which, he sees so clearly, must follow Angola.

Indeed, his present actions, as this article goes to press, display a depressing insensitivity to the same psychological factors which were so important in Angola. Mr. Kissinger is now in Africa, attempting to formulate an African policy, which has been so neglected. His meetings, however, will include visits with black nationalist leaders whose goals include the violent overthrow of the white minority governments of Rhodesia and South Africa. Secretary Kissinger will not, of course, support directly any such violent action, but his visits to the leaders of these movements will *ipso facto* endow them with considerable prestige and importance, making their support by other African regimes, and by non-African countries even more certain. Our failure to prevail in Angola was, in my opinion, a prime factor in the decision of Mozambique to close the border against Rhodesian rail traffic, which was of enormous benefit to both countries. Over the years, we have seen a large number of *de facto* arrangements worked out between the Black African

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nations and the governments of Rhodesia and South Africa. As the current of events is running today, however, that kind of black-white cooperation is not possible.

And look at the position the United States finds itself in at this point in Africa. We lost in Angola, partly at least because the Dick Clarks of the world told us that we had no vital interests there. Now if we were to make a determined stand against Soviet imperialism in Africa, we would be faced with the unpleasant task of backing white minority governments against black nationalists. If it was difficult for responsible African opinion to acquiesce in our Angolan action because of the involvement of South Africa, imagine the impossibility of any black opposition to the claims of the black nationalist movements in Rhodesia. We would be on the wrong side, so declared unanimously. Angola may have been the right place to act if only because of the possibility of aiding a black faction.

Having failed to make the required effort in Angola, it now appears that we will encourage the black movements in Rhodesia and South Africa. My own opposition to that position is well-known, but here I mention only the likelihood that we will soon be watching on television the results of the race war that our actions have helped encourage. It will not be pretty. There are 275,000 whites and 5.7 million blacks in Rhodesia. The idea that there can be a peaceful settlement is a pipe dream. When the present stability maintained in Rhodesia breaks down under black nationalist pressure, with the assistance of Cuban mercenaries, the result will be a power struggle between competing black factions. The whites, insignificant numerically, will be ground between the upper and nether millstones, and the process will not be pretty to watch. When we have told the world that the white minority governments are illegitimate, and have said that we will accept refugees, we must also be prepared to accept some responsibility for what develops. By denying this responsibility before any charge was made, Secretary Kissinger shows that he knows what he has done.

Kissinger v. Moynihan

Throughout this article I have discussed two attitudes towards the world, and the possibilities they offer for differences in foreign policy. While nothing as complex as a nation's foreign policy could be represented by a single individual, it should be clear that the two attitudes correspond roughly to the public perception of the attitudes of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and former Ambassador to the United Nations Daniel Patrick

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Moynihan. In the public view, these individuals stand as types representing the two ways to look at the world. The popular response to these individuals is therefore quite interesting.

Secretary Kissinger has had considerable success in mobilizing the major opinion-molding segments of American society in support of his policies, in Indochina, in the Mideast, and with respect to the Soviet Union. He has generally received considerable support from the people as a whole, at least as measured by the results of public opinion polls. Nonetheless, there is very little evidence that the average person understands the finer details of his policies, and he recently has been unsuccessful in selling American initiatives in the two specific areas of the world I have discussed.

At the same time, the public response to Ambassador Moynihan's style in the United Nations provides a nice contrast. It is clear that Moynihan touched a nerve, issued some kind of call to which millions of Americans responded.

What he did, actually, was show them the world with a positive attitude, for a change. Moynihan, in the course of debates in the United Nations, expressed the opinions of the common man on the situation in the world today. Most of us feel that the United States is not a bad country. We see ourselves as industrious (if somewhat greedy), but ready to help other nations which have not made out as well. We see ourselves as the strongest nation in the world, actually contributing to the cause of freedom, whatever our intellectuals say, and doing it without much thanks. We see ourselves criticized for slight defects in our institutions by nations with no institutions at all, to speak of, nations with a history of tyranny, slavery and dictatorship.

Moynihan articulated these feelings. Further, he supported them, authoritatively. Most of us feel that there are good responses to the charges leveled at us on the floor of the U.N., but we aren't quick enough to think of them, or our grounding in history is deficient. Moynihan, a professor at perhaps the most prestigious of American universities, supplied crushing answers, backed up by the education and experience most of us will never have. We responded with gratitude, and renewed determination to make the sacrifices needed to defend a cherished way of life.

This was a foreign policy that the average American could understand. It was policy cast in terms of everyone's personal experience with other people. It did not seek to reconcile irreconcilables, or to explain the actions of aggressors and bullies as natural reactions to our own faults. Of course, we are told, the average American doesn't understand the complexities of foreign

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relations; foreign policy must be conducted by those trained in its disciplines, and in secret to boot. There is, no doubt, a need for secrecy in the day-to-day operations of diplomacy, but not about the goals and aims of our policies. These must be open to the people if the people are to support them. If we do not trust them, our policies must be doomed to failure: they will never gain the understanding and approval of the average person.

Back at the end of the Vietnam War, Eugene V. Rostow was asked exactly how much money ought to be committed to the defense of South Vietnam. His response was that the amount was unimportant. What was critical was that we reaffirm our committment to victory. His point was that the battle was psychological, not material. We could win if we wanted to win; if not, no amount of treasure and men would succeed. I believe that the event bears out his feeling. Our defeat in Vietnam was a psychological one, brought about by policies so limited in scope, and so tentative that they had no chance of success. The Paris Accord of 1973 provided only an umbrella under which our surrender could be accomplished.

It is not too late today. Our foreign policy can regain some impetus, can be recharged by a commitment to freedom. What is needed is leadership which will issue the call. America's abilities are great, if the will can be found to mobilize them. Strong leadership from the U.S. should not be seen as domination and imperialism. It should be seen for what it is, action in the interests of all nations. I believe that it will be seen that way, if it is pursued with confidence. A change from a negative to a positive foreign policy is long overdue.

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NUCLEAR WAR IN SOVIET MILITARY THINKING – THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY

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U.S. Congressional Staff

Much has been written in recent months about the disparity in U.S. - Soviet defense expenditures, and the growing military capabilities of the Soviet Union in conventional and strategic forces. As a consequence, a new debate has emerged in this country concerning the adequacy of the nation's defense posture.

While this debate has served to highlight the lack of consensus in the nation at large over the means and ends of American foreign policy, and what the proper role for the United States should be as a world power in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the debate has also focused attention on the age-old question of what constitutes the necessary force levels, and combination of force structures, needed to adequately defend this country's foreign policy and defense interests. In the nuclear age this question assumes even greater significance than in earlier periods of history, for the deterrence of war today has become as important a function of the military as the capability to fight wars and win them. Thus, the ultimate question facing the United States, in an age where it no longer enjoys a position of nuclear superiority, is what level of strategic forces represents "sufficiency" or "realistic deterrence". And although no question is of more importance to the survival of the nation, it is increasingly difficult to address.

The popular belief in the United States, nourished by statements from public officials, is that nuclear war would mean an Armageddon, without a victor, and without survivors. Expressing his thought, Secretary of State Kissinger observed:

> Historically a conflict of ideology and geopolitical interests, such as that which characterizes the current international scene, has almost invariably led to conflict. *But in the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality, humanity could not survive such a repetition of history. No amount of rhetoric can change these realities.* (1)

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(1) Department of State Bulletin, February 3, 1976, p. 3.

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Kissinger is arguing that global stability exists through what is popularly called the "balance of terror". This principle, also referred to as the doctrine of security through "mutual vulnerability", or "mutual assured destruction", assumes in its simplest form that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is capable of undertaking a preemptive strike against the other. The strategic arms debate in the United States has been predicated exclusively upon this principle, and has resulted in a doctrine which, in theory, is designed to give the United States the strategic capability to withstand a Soviet first strike, and retaliate with enough strategic forces to inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviet Union. It is this doctrine which represents the essence of the U.S. deterrence strategy; and it is this doctrine by which sufficiency is measured. In concrete terms strategic sufficiency, as defined by then Secretary of Defense McNamara, means that U.S. forces:

> . . must be sufficiently large to possess an 'Assured Destruction' capability. By this I mean an ability to inflict at all times and under all foreseeable conditions an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor – even after absorbing a surprise attack . . In the case of the Soviet Union, I would judge that a capability on our part to destroy, say, one-fifth to one-fourth of her population and one-half of her industrial capability would serve as an effective deterrent. (2)

McNamara's enunciation of the policy of 'Assured Destruction' represented a fundamental shift in the U.S. strategic deterrence doctrine, which for most of the 1950's had been predicated upon 'massive retaliation'. This shift in U.S. policy reflected the changing conditions of the international environment, but more importantly, American policy makers recognized that massive retaliation lacked flexibility, and as such was undermining the credibility of the U.S. deterrence posture. (3) As Y. Harkabi has noted, the magnitude of the threat of punishment has a direct correlation with the value of the deterrence, but only up to some undefinable point, after which the probability that the threat will actually be implemented declines, again

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(2) For a brief discussion on U.S. strategic deterrence doctrine from McNamara to Schlesinger see: "Analyses of Effects of Limited Nuclear Warfare," Committee Print, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, September 1975, pp. 25-39; see especially p. 27. Hereafter referred to as "Effects of Limited Nuclear War."

(3) The now declassified NSC Paper 68, Spring, 1950, reveals a sharp difference in the actual versus the declaratory U.S. policy regarding "massive retaliation,"

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in direct correlation with the credibility of the deterrence. (4)

U.S. deterrence strategy has been refined many times over since McNamara first articulated the policy of 'Assured Destruction', but the heart of what constitutes strategic sufficiency remains essentially unchanged. There has, however, as of late emerged a new group of critics who are challenging the credibility of 'Assured Destruction.' *

The doctrine of mutual assured destruction, the acronym of which is the commonly referred to MAD, has been the subject of intensive critical study, and has resulted in the contemporary "counterforce-countervalue" debate. (5) Until recently this debate was largely academic, but it assumed new policy significance when President Nixon, beginning in 1969, requested funding for a number of strategic R&D programs designed to enhance the U.S. counterforce capability.

This "counterforce-countervalue" debate has had both a pervasive and pernicious impact on U.S. strategic developments, and popular opinion. The conventional belief that stability between the superpowers exists through mutual assured destruction has led to strong demands by influential opinion makers in the United States to eliminate a number of this country's strategic R&D programs which the Soviets could interpret as being destabilizing. The 1972 treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of antiballistic missiles systems (ABM) was one clear result of this thinking. Both President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger urged U.S. approval of the ABM treaty on the grounds that it would eliminate an area of potentially "dangerous defensive competition", and that U.S. continuance of the ABM program might be seen as offensive strategy, "threatening the Soviet deterrent", by making U.S. targets less vulnerable to a Soviet attack. (6) Similarly, the ongoing debate over whether or not the yield and accuracy

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(4) See Y. Harkabi, *Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace*, (Jerusalem, Ma'arachot: Publishing House of the Israel Defense Forces, 1966); pp. 28-30.

*For an excellent, concise critique of MAD see: James E. Dornan, "Detente and the Pending Strategic Crisis," ACU Education and Research Institute, Washington, D.C. 1975. See especially pp. 11-16.

(5) For example: Robert Sherman, "The Fallacies of Counterforce," *Strategic Review*, (Spring, 1975) pp. 48-57. An excellent rebuttal to this article was written by Amoretta and Francis Hoeber, "The Case Against the Case Against Counterforce," *Strategic Review*, (Fall, 1975), pp. 54-65.

(6) For the rationale behind this argument read: Gene R. LaRoque, "Security

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of the U.S. Minuteman force should be increased reflects this thinking. And the travesty of this ongoing debate in the United States is that it finds no parallel in the Soviet Union. Certain scholastics and policy makers in this country persist in continuing a debate concerning the adequacy of the U.S. deterrence posture without either considering the Soviet position, or if it is being considered, ignoring its implications. As Dr. William Scott has pointed out:

> There is a strange reluctance in the West to examine Soviet writings. . . It is much easier to sit on the fence and speculate what course the Soviets might take. A thorough analysis of Soviet publications on military matters, combined with known facts about Soviet weaponry could present explanations of Soviet behavior (and beliefs regarding nuclear war) that would be uncomfortable to study. Thus, in the market place, the myths still have ready sales. (7)

One such myth, which is the central and ultimately critical issue concerning the adequacy of the U.S. deterrence posture, is that stability between the superpowers exists through mutual assured destruction. U.S. proponents of MAD argue that the failure of deterrence must be obvious to all national leaders, and as such they doubt the efficacy of military power as a tool of diplomacy in the nuclear age. Commenting on this, Secretary Kissinger has argued that:

> . . . to consider the mass use of nuclear weapons in terms of the destruction of civilian populations, one faces a political impossibility, not to speak of a moral impossibility. (8)

But while the issue of nuclear weapons may be considered immoral and unthinkable by U.S. leaders, this view is not shared by their Soviet counterparts.

Focusing public attention on this question, Dr. Malcolm Currie, Director of Research and Engineering with the U.S. Department of Defense, recently

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Through Mutual Vulnerability," Occasional Paper No. 2, The Stanley Foundation, 1973, pp. 1-12.

(7) William F. Scott, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy: Realities and Misunderstandings," *Strategic Review* (Summer, 1975), p. 65. This is an excellent article in which the author argues that Western analysts have failed, as a group, to inform the public about Soviet military doctrine and strategy.

(8) "Effects of Limited War," p. 29.

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emphasized that nuclear war in Soviet politico-military thought is not only thinkable, but perhaps inevitable. (9) The inevitability of war is, of course, a fundamental tenet of Soviet ideology, and is based on the Marxist-Leninist concepts of the inherently destructive nature of capitalism and imperialism. While Soviet views on nuclear war, like those of the United States, have vacillated since World War II, since the mid 1950's the predominant Soviet attitude has been that the Soviet Union would survive a nuclear war. In 1954 the Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Malenkov, spoke of "the destruction of world civilization", but was sharply admonished by Molotov (then Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Party leader Khrushchev who insisted that only the capitalist system would perish.

In 1967, a more definitive Soviet position was taken by General Secretary Brezhnev when he said that "in a clash with any aggressor the Soviet Union will win a victory worthy of our great people". Since that time Soviet pronouncements reflecting the belief in "mutual suicide" and "no victory" have not been evident in that country's internal strategic debate. On the contrary, the Soviet strategic debate begins with the premise that nuclear war is survivable. As recently expressed by Rear Admiral V. Sheliag, one of that country's military spokemen:

> Closely connected with the news in the character of a world war is the question of its consequences. In the West, for instance, it is claimed that humanity, world civilization would perish in the event of such war, that everything living on earth would be annihilated. . .
>
> Marxist-Leninists resolutely reject (this). They have always considered and still consider war, all the more so a thermonuclear war, as the greatest calamity for the people. But the Communists harbor no sentiments of hopelessness or pessimism. (10)

It is this Soviet attitude towards nuclear war which sheds light on the incompatibility of Soviet political and military ambitions with detente diplomacy, at least as detente is commonly understood in the United States.

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(9) See News Conference by Dr. Malcolm Currie, Director of Research and Engineering, The Pentagon, February 26, 1976.

(10) For the most comprehensive discussion in the English language see: Leon Goure, *Soviet Civil Defense in the Seventies* (Coral Gables, Florida: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1975).This study was prepared for the U.S. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. For the above citation see p. 17. This study is hereafter referred to as *Soviet Civil Defense in the Seventies*.

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Detente, as projected by its architect, Sec. Kissinger, was designed to produce more than a stable strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was designed to create a web of interdependent interests between the two countries which would serve as a constraint on Soviet efforts to expand its global power and influence, enabling both superpowers to pursue their national interests without destabilizing the so-called "grand design." Obviously, detente has failed to accomplish either of these U.S. objectives. But detente, or rather peaceful coexistence as it is called in Soviet terminology, has always had quite a different purpose for the Soviet leadership. As even a cursory reading of the Soviet literature and policy statements reveals, the global activities and ambitions of the Soviet Union, while irreconcilable with the U.S. understanding of detente, are entirely consistent with the U.S.S.R.'s interpretation of peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence, in Soviet politico-military thinking, is designed to alter the form of the struggle between the opposing power blocs and reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. But detente, according to Soviet understanding, does not require the abandonment of the fundamentally incompatible and ideological objectives of the two power blocs. On the contrary, the Soviet view is that peaceful coexistence will create favorable conditions for reducing the potential level of conflict between the opposing power blocs, while enabling the U.S.S.R. to support revolutionary mass movements and national liberation wars, "right up to the complete and final victory of communism on a world scale". In discussing this Soviet view of peaceful coexistence, within the framework of the Soviet attitude towards nuclear war, Major-General K. Bochkarev wrote:

> Marxist-Leninists are not panicked in the face of terrifying danger created by imperialism nor depict it as a prelude to the 'end of the world' . . . But if, nevertheless, the imperialists do manage to fan the flames of a world nuclear war, what will its consequences be? In answering such a question it is necessary to clearly understand that the bourgeois pacifists' argument about the 'end of the world' in such a war and the responsibility of victory benefit only the aggressor and the nuclear maniacs, who would very much like one or other of those against whom they are contemplating a nuclear attack to freeze with terror and lay down their arms. No, this is not how things stand. Nuclear war, despite its destructiveness, does not diminish the problem of struggle and the (significance of) correlation of forces.* (11)

(11) *Ibid.*, p. 16.

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Bochkarev's statement is significant, for unlike Secy. Kissinger who denies that strategic nuclear forces are usable for foreign policy ends, Soviet strategic thinking does not reflect this inhibition. Translating doctrine into policy, the Soviet leadership has argued that "any country which contemplates allowing the opponent to strike first is acting contrary to rational behavior and the rules of war". Putting policy into practice, in 1970 Soviet broadcasts to China warned that the U.S.S.R. would not hesitate to resort to a nuclear first strike. (12) The continuing Soviet build-up in conventional and strategic forces is, then, the logical extension of Soviet strategic doctrine, and it extends far beyond any conceivable defensive requirements, or interest in 'parity' or 'essential equivalence' that country might have, but instead reflects the Soviet desire to achieve a strategic war-fighting, war-winning capability. Further, this Soviet ambition has actually been enhanced by efforts on the part of the United States to achieve meaningful strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union. As former U.S. SALT negotiator Paul Nitze has warned:

> . . . there is every prospect that under the terms of the SALT agreements the Soviet Union will continue to pursue a nuclear superiority that is not merely quantitative but designed to produce a theoretical war-winning capability. Further, there is a major risk that, if such conditions were achieved, the Soviet Union would adjust its policies and actions in ways that would undermine the present deterrent situation, with results that could only resurrect the danger of nuclear confrontation or, alternatively, lead to Soviet expansion through the use of the nuclear threat. (13)

Not only has the Soviet Union failed to adopt a symmetric view of strategic forces, and what constitutes the basis for mutual deterrence, but it has undertaken a massive program designed to protect that country's civilian population and economic installations from all instruments of

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*The correlation of forces in Soviet terminology defines the aggregate of forces bearing on the situation, including political, psychological, military and economic, which will eventually lead to Soviet supremacy and the defeat of the West.

(12) For a discussion of this see: Hearings by the Civil Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. See March 2, 1976 Hearings; committee print not available at date of publication. Hereafter referred to as "March 2, 1976 Hearings."

(13) Paul Nitze, *Nuclear Strategy In An Era of Detente*, (Mimeograph) October 27, 1975, p. 1.

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massive destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. And ironically, at a time when U.S. support for the ABM treaty was being sought on the grounds that it would be destabilizing for the United States to make its targets less vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike, the Soviet civil defense (CD) program was being rapidly expanded. Following ratification of the SALT I agreement, and the ABM treaty, the Soviets created the position of Deputy Minister for Civil Defense, a position that is on a level equal with that country's five other defense ministries, thus revealing the significance which the Soviets attach to this position.

While much attention has focused on the Soviet military build-up, very little attention has been devoted to the Soviet civil defense program, a program which must be considered destabilizing if the arguments which led to the ABM treaty are accepted. And only now is the Congress and the U.S. Department of Defense beginning to think of what the consequences of this preparation are in terms of our own strategic thinking, and our own strategic capabilities.*

Two of this country's foremost experts on the Soviet civil defense program are Dr. Leon Goure, with the University of Miami's Advanced Institute for International Studies, and Mr. T.K. Jones, the top technical advisor to former SALT negotiator Paul Nitze, and current product evaluation manager of the Boeing Aerospace Company. (14) As part of the House of Representatives' consideration of the fiscal year 1977 defense authorization legislation, Jones and Goure appeared before the Civil Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services. And in a rare U.S. public forum on Soviet civil defense they discussed the implications of this program for U.S. national security. (15)

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*See, for example, the hearings announced by Senator William Proxmire, (D-Wisconsin) in the April 14, 1976 Congressional Record, p. S 5773. Under the Chairmanship of Senator Proxmire the Joint Committee on Defense Production has begun a "comprehensive review of the nation's industrial, economic, and civil readiness-the first such congressional review in over 25 years."

(14) The importance of the studies undertaken by Messrs. Jones and Goure on the Soviet civil defense program cannnot be overemphasized. Dr. Goure's most recent book, *War Survival in Soviet Strategy* is the most definitive book available on this subject today. (Coral Gables, Florida: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976).

(15) See "March 2, 1976 Hearings."

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The Soviet civil defense preparations are the direct derivative of that country's strategic thinking, a strategic thinking which considers civil defense a determining factor in the course and outcome of a possible nuclear war. Commenting on this, the head of the Soviet Civil Defense Ministry, Colonel-General A. Altunin, in 1973 wrote:

> Under present conditions the preparation of the country's rear for defense against means of mass destruction has become without a doubt, one of the decisive strategic factors ensuring the ability of the state to function in wartime, and in the final analysis, the attainment of victory. (16)

Predicated on the belief that nuclear war is both thinkable and survivable — even capable of producing a victor — the Soviet Union has undertaken a civil defense program which, conservatively estimated, costs the U.S.S.R. approximately $1 billion annually in equivalent U.S. terms, or roughly $4 for every Soviet citizen. The Soviet Civil Defense Ministry has a permanent organization staff of some 72,000, which can be augmented by the U.S.S.R.'s 500,000 member police force, and the civil defense program is an integral component of all Soviet national planning, from urban planning to industrial organization. This has led, among other things, to the dispersion of critical Soviet industries, (with 80% of all new industry having been dispersed to some one thousand new small and medium-sized towns built during the last decade), extensive bomb-resistant construction, low building density, and the stockpiling of a one-year food supply for population and livestock, with plans to expand the food supply further. Civil defense training is mandatory for all Soviet citizens; it is included in the school curriculum, and there is a twenty-one hour basic training program for all adults, followed by a mandatory twenty hours of refresher courses. In 1975, camouflaged as "military sports games", 23 million Russians of predominantly school age were involved in a detailed exercise of various civil defense role assignments. There continue to be reports of evacuation planning and staff exercises, and special towns have been constructed for this purpose.

The Soviet civil defense program is organized on the "territorial production principle", and oversight of the program extends from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of

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(16) *Soviet Civil Defense in the Seventies*, p. 27.

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Ministers down through the republics, territories, regions, cities, to the district level. For analytical purposes the Soviet civil defense manual divides the CD role into three groups. The first group includes tasks related to civilian population protection, e.g., basic education in the preparation and construction of protective shelters, and the evacuation and dispersion procedures from the urban centers. In the second and third groups tasks relating to increasing the survivability of the industrial facilities, the execution and rescue of emergency repair, among others, can be found. And it is not by accident that this program embodies the recommendations which resulted from the U.S. strategic bombing survey of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, a study undertaken to assess the precautions necessary to survive a possible future nuclear attack on the United States. All steps, then, which are necessary to guarantee population and industrial survival and political continuity in the event of a nuclear war are covered in the Soviet civil defense program. (17)

Can the Soviet Union's civil defense program be dismissed as mere propaganda? The attention to detail, and the amount of time, human and financial resources that are being devoted to his program would make this a very expensive exercise indeed. Nevertheless, it would be an effort well worth the expense if the United States could be led into believing that it did not have the capability to inflict 'assured destruction' on the Soviet Union. From available evidence, however, it is apparent that the Soviet civil defense preparation is more than mere propaganda* The Soviet leaders for substantive reasons, consider CD of major strategic significance, as critical a component of defense as the active capabilities of its military.

In an effort to verify the Soviet claims regarding the viability of their CD program, Mr. Jones, with the support of the Boeing Aerospace Company,

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(17) The direct translation of the Soviet civil defense manual is available to the American public through the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Technical Information Service. See e.g. "Civil Defense, Moscow, 1970, ORNL-TR-2793" and "Civil Defense, Moscow, 1974, ORNL-TR-2845."

*Countering the critique that large-scale evacuation cannot be successful unless the population has the experience of frequent exercises, Mr. Jones in his testimony before the Armed Services Committee cited the results of a recent Stanford Research Institute study. This study concluded that the most important preparatory measures for a successful civil defense are planning and the existence and training of the cadre which will direct evacuation operations. As Mr. Jones pointed out, the evidence is that the Soviets are implementing these preparatory measures.

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has undertaken a number of studies. These studies revealed that Soviet claims of minimal population losses (three to four percent of their total population, or some 7 to 11 million people) in a U.S. nuclear retaliatory attack, appear quite realistic.

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Jones discussed in some detail the survival prospects of the Soviet population from a U.S. second strike. Jones made the disclosure that if all the weapons in the U.S. retaliatory arsenal were delivered against Soviet territory, they would destroy all the people in an aggregate area equal only to three percent of the Soviet land area; the people in the remaining 97 percent of the land area would survive. These figures assume that the population was not protected by buildings or terrain, and all blast, thermal and radiation effects of the weapons detonated were above ground. Assuming even simple protection, such as foxhole-type shelters, the area covered by U.S. weapons would be reduced to about one-third of one percent. If the U.S. weapons were detonated at ground level, the lethal fallout might cover about ten percent of the Soviet land area (variations would result from such factors as wind, rain, and topography). But such a detonation would reduce by half the lethal area of the U.S. weapons against the urban-industrial targets, and people could be protected from the fallout. Soviet population evacuation and dispersal to a U.S. attack would reduce fatalities to about eight percent of the total population (some 20 million), even if the evacuees were not protected from fallout. This fatality level could, however, be reduced even further. If the evacuating population built simple shelters fatalities could be kept to about two percent. (Shelters capable of holding ten people, with a blast resistance of forty pounds per square inch, and a radiation factor of about one thousand, would take only a matter of hours to build, and directions for their construction are included in the civil defense training). Assuming a U.S. retaliatory attack were directed against the Soviet urban-industrial areas, the weapons were burst above ground, and the population was evacuated without protective shelters, Soviet fatalities would be slightly over two percent. The estimates for the Soviet population loss as a result of a U.S. nuclear retaliatory attack then range between six and twenty million. Such a population loss compares with the loss of twenty million Russians during World War II, and some thirty million self-inflicted losses during the Stalin purges of the 1930's.

Even under the most adverse conditions to the Soviet Union, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee revealed, a U.S. retaliatory attack could destroy only about 70 million Russians, or 27% of the Soviet

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population. But the level of fatality to the Soviet population would be determined largely by factors the Soviet Union controlled, such as the level of evacuation and dispersal, and whether or not even primitive shelters were built. The highest official U.S. estimate that 100 million Russians could be killed in a U.S. retaliatory attack presupposes that the Soviet urban population would remain concentrated in the cities, an expectation that is wholly without foundation, given Soviet strategic thinking and the extent of the civil defense preparation.

Soviet industrial centers, like the urban population, could withstand a U.S. retaliatory attack. Industrial survival rate estimates range from fifty to ninety percent, with damage so limited that machinery would not have to be rebuilt. By changing from two workshifts a day to three, the Soviets could more than adequately compensate for damaged machinery, and need not suffer a loss of productive capacity. In the Boeing studies undertaken to estimate the effectiveness of the Soviet industrial protective measures, using the Seattle-Tacoma area as a laboratory, preliminary results indicated that the civil defense measures were particularly effective against the low-yield, low accuracy characteristics of the surviving U.S. retaliatory force. These preliminary results revealed further that if the Soviet industrial targets were attacked with the Poseidon and Trident warheads, and these targets were protected in the way prescribed by the Soviet civil defense manual, only 25 to 50 percent of the targeted industry would be destroyed in the primary area. The supporting industries would have an even better survival rate e.g., 75% of the blast furnaces, 75% of the foundries, 90% of the machine shops, 80% of the aircraft-related industries, and 80% of the steel fabrication facilities survived. In short, the preliminary results of the Boeing studies confirmed the feasibility of the Soviet civil defense program. (18)

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(18) For a detailed discussion see the following: "March 2, 1976 Hearings," testimony by Mr. T.K. Jones. See also Mr. Jones' *Trends in the Strategic Balance and Their Significance*, (Washington, D.C.: The Institute of American Relations, 1976).

An excellent and concise review, not only of the Boeing Studies, but also of Soviet strategic thinking and the current strategic balance can be found in "Nuclear War: A Soviet Option." This paper was presented by O.C. Boileau, President, Boeing Aerospace Company, to the Harvard-MIT Seminar on Technology and International Security, Boston, Massachusetts, March 23, 1976. Hereafter referred to as "Nuclear War: A Soviet Option."

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Having discussed the impact of a nuclear exchange on the Soviet Union it would serve well to discuss the possible impact of such exchange on the United States. The U.S. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency undertook a post-nuclear attack study (PONAST II) on the survival and recovery prospects of the United States and the Soviet Union. A hypothetical massive nuclear attack upon the United States by the Soviet Union, followed by a U.S. counter-attack, was considered.

The scenario presupposed the Soviet Union delivered 1,400 warheads, with 6,800 megatons, on the United States. Approximately one-third of the Soviet megatonnage was delivered to U.S. urban industrial targets, with the remaining going to U.S. military targets. The scenario further presupposed that 10 percent of the U.S. urban population had evacuated the large cities.

In this postulated attack, 109 million people, or 43 percent of the U.S. population survived.

The 57 percent population loss is explained by the fact that the U.S. population is concentrated in only 140 cities with no effective civil defense program. (For the United States to inflict an equivalent amount of damage on the Soviet population, 1,000 Soviet cities would have to be attacked and the Soviets would have to fail to implement civil defense procedures).

In the study, U.S. industry labor force survival generally coincided with the overall population survival rate.

Because U.S. manufacturing facilities are not protected against nuclear blast, only 27 percent of the U.S. manufacturing industry received light or no damage. Electric power, raw materials and transportation survived at higher rates, and presented little constraint for U.S. recovery.

Seventeen of 50 federal government agencies with 22 percent of their employees survived, and the Governors and principal elements of 20 of the 50 state governments survived.

The study concluded it would take the United States some 60 to 90 days to restore operation of the federal government, and some 6 years to effect a civil recovery to the 1965 per capita level of production.

While the PONAST II study was very controlled, the variables reflected what are considered to be realistic conditions of nuclear war. (19) The study

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(19) U.S. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, PONAST II. This study was recently undertaken by an interagency study group comprising over twenty federal agencies at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The briefing is unclassified. For a discussion on the

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could not, of course, assess the untold human suffering that would result from a nuclear exchange. Significantly, however, the study showed that despite lack of preparation, the United States as a nation survived the postulated nuclear attack. Nuclear war, then, is survivable. As such, no country can afford to mortgage its future on deterrence alone, particularly a deterrence posture that is not backed up with the capability or will to actually carry out the threat, or a deterrence posture that lacks credibility. Despite the spectre of mass destruction raised by the possibility of a nuclear war, the Soviet belief that nuclear war is survivable – even winnable – must be given credence. Indeed, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in a report published last year, concluded that man, the biosphere, and its ecosystems would survive nuclear war. This conclusion contrasts sharply with the widely prevalent belief in the United States that the superpowers have enough nuclear weapons to destroy not only each other, but the entire world many times over, so-called overkill. The simple truth is that the United States has never possessed overkill capability, as it is commonly understood. Both public officials and popular perceptions have been overly impressed with the aggregate numbers of strategic weapons systems and the technical properties of these weapons, without proper regard given to the tactical and strategic doctrines which underlie the use of these weapons. The fallacious assumptions and simplified interpretations regarding the awesomeness of nuclear weapons have then led to the continuing belief in the myth of overkill. Commenting on overkill at a Harvard-MIT seminar Mr. O.C.Boileau, the President of the Boeing Aerospace Company observed:

> Ever since the Soviet Union got its first nuclear weapon, the American policy has been to deter nuclear conflict rather than to attempt to win it. I'm sure that most Americans believe that if the Soviet Union were insane enough to attack us, it would be annihilated by the U.S. retaliation. "Overkill" has become a buzz word. We're told that the U.S. has the capability to kill every man, woman and child in the Soviet Union many times over.
>
> Actually, the U.S. has never had this kind of capability. We do have more than enough capability to kill the people in Russia's cities,

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same subject see: "Briefing on Counterforce Attacks," Committee Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, January, 1975. At these hearings former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger detailed the casualties and destruction expected to result from nuclear counterforce attacks against U.S. military installations.

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> provided they don't leave town. But the term overkill is nothing but mathematical fiddle-faddle; it has nothing to do with reality. After all, you could put the world's entire population in one piece of territory 19 miles in diameter, and kill them all with half a dozen bombs. (20)

The misconceptions in this country regarding overkill, and the belief that stability exists through mutual assured destruction, particularly in this age of detente, have made thoughtful and objective analysis concerning the political and military threat confronting the United States extraordinarily difficult. Yet while the United States has advocated a policy of stability through MAD it has done so unilaterally, with the result that this country may not in fact have the capability to inflict assured destruction on the Soviet Union in a retaliatory attack, thus placing the credibility of the U.S. deterrence posture in doubt. The Soviet Union, by contrast, has prepared for the possibility of nuclear war, and is prepared to emerge from such a war with a viable social, economic and political order. The consequences of the asymmetry in U.S. - Soviet strategic thinking are, then, significant. As Professor James Dougherty has cautioned:

> As technology develops, the anxiety of nation-states which are really free to pursue policies of their own choosing still prefer to base their security on some form of deterrence or power balance than on the expectation of disarmament and effective international peacekeeping. Perhaps this will strike many as illogical. But the realm of international politics is governed by more than logic, and often by less. When we think about national armaments, we have to think not only about how we would like nations to behave – based on the ethical and rational ideals of Western civilization – but also about how nations do in fact behave. (21)

The Soviets have undertaken a massive military build-up in conventional and strategic forces; they are making rapid technological advances in stra-

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(20) "Nuclear War: A Soviet Option," p. 13. For a brief illustration of the importance of military doctrine see William Schneider, Jr., "The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula," in *Korea in the World Today*, ed. Roger Pearson (Washington, D.C.: Council on American Affairs, 1976) pp. 23-39.

(21) See James Dougherty, *How to Think About Arms Control and Disarmanent* (N.Y., N.Y.: Crane, Dursak, & Co., 1973), p. 7. This study was published for the National Strategy Information Center, Inc. An important contribution to the current debate concerning the adequacy of this country's deterrence posture is made by Paul Nitze. See "Assuring Strategic Stability In An Era of Detente," *Foreign Affairs*, LIV (January, 1976), pp. 207-232.

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tegic arms, and they have undertaken an intensive civil defense preparation program. These efforts combine to pose an ever-growing threat to U.S. security and global stability. Dr. Malcolm Currie has estimated that by late 1977 the Soviet Union could launch an ICBM attack against the United States, absorb a retaliatory and counter-military attack, and still have the capacity to attack strategic Chinese and NATO targets and have more throw-weight than the United States. Indeed, since 1973 the Soviet Union has enjoyed substantial post-exchange superiority. The Soviet post-exchange advantage has continued to grow since that time, and it has now become evident that nuclear parity with the United States was never a Soviet objective. On the contrary, available evidence indicates that the U.S.S.R. is seeking superiority over the United States in every significant area of military power. If nuclear superiority is devoid of any operational meaning, as Secretary Kissinger has argued, the relevant question is why do the Soviets seek it? A look at the historial record would indicate that the Soviets have aggressively attempted to exploit their military capability for political purposes, even when they were strategically inferior to the United States. Soviet strategic superiority would, then, likely result in an intensification on their part to translate military might into political ends. They would seek the fruits of war without the cost of war.

Were the Soviets directly or indirectly to bring their strategic edge to bear during an international crisis, the U.S. – or its allies – might easily be intimidated. Given current strategic realities, any Western leader might hesitate to challenge a direct Soviet military threat when a vital interest of the U.S.S.R. was at stake, much less employ strategic weapons in the event of lower-level Soviet aggression. It is for this reason that the credibility of the U.S. deterrence posture must be questioned; and it is for this reason that the United States must continue to pursue vigorously those strategic programs designed to enhance the U.S. counterforce capability. If the United States is to have a credible nuclear deterrent its strategic missiles must have greater accuracy to compensate for the payload and launcher advantages allowed the Soviets under SALT I. Further, this country's strategic weapons must be able to accommodate the Soviet civil defense program by having the capability to hit Soviet targets that have been hardened to withstand nuclear attack. As Congressman Jack Kemp has argued, "Our weapons will always have the capability to knock down buildings and blow off roofs in the Soviet Union. But the machinery in those buildings may be hardened against in-

*See news conference by Dr. Malcolm Currie, Director of Research and Engineering, The Pentagon, February 26, 1976.

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COMMUNITY TO CITY: A PERSPECTIVE OF AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Ordway P. Burden

Introduction

Certainly the need for security forces is as old as the city. Even in the time of Hur Moheb about 1340 B.C. there was a kind of river police force on the Nile in Egypt (1).

The idea of paid, civilian police, distinct from the military and responsible to the public, not the king or central executive, is, however, relatively modern. It is a development of the industrial city of the last two centuries, when population growth made the old concept of citizen-constable unequal to the task of maintaining order in a large and complicated jumble of different communities with separate customs and attitudes. When the entire city was small and homogeneous, and deadly weapons scarce, it was much easier for the average able-bodied citizen to exert his authority over more unruly members of the population.

To many Americans 175 years ago a professional police force was an unthinkable encroachment on basic civil liberties. Wrote one Boston newspaper editor, "If there ever comes a time when Americans have to have their cities hire paid professional policemen, it will be the end of freedom and democracy as we have known it."(2)

Perhaps this was an end to the world they knew, but it was an end brought about by the conditions which necessitated the introduction of policemen, not by the officers themselves.

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(1) Earl E. Riley, former executive director, Mississippi Coast Crime Commission, "Historical Notes", Law and Order Magazine, June, 1975.

(2) Joel Plummer, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Safety, Address before Tennessee Association of Sheriffs, Aug. 6, 1975.

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In colonial America law enforcement as we now know it was largely a community responsibility, undertaken by individual citizens by turns or as the need arose. Preserving order in the boroughs and towns were members of the able-bodied, free citizenry who rotated in the positions of constables and watchmen. The sheriff, principal keeper of the peace for the county, was chosen from among wealthy landowners.

The American sheriff, like his English counterpart, could summon a posse comitatus, that is, raise a group of men to pursue a criminal or squelch an insurrection. He was chief administrator of the county courts, and supervised the impanelment of juries. As a law enforcement officer, the colonial enjoyed far greater autonomy than the Englishman, who was appointed by the king and subject to regular scrutiny by Parliament. This independence extended generally to other officers of local government, the justices of the peace and jurors, and the propertied class from which they came. What direction Parliament and the Crown gave to American affairs was on the colonial level, leaving local government to develop more freely.

The communities which grew up on the Eastern seaboard in the seventeenth century were homogenous, religious societies which strove to suppress immoral as well as criminal behavior. On this side of the Atlantic, convictions for adultery, blasphemy, fornication, swearing and profaning the Sabbath, were frequent in the Southern colonies as well as the Puritan sections. In England prosecution was rare for these misdeeds.

If it was easier to be convicted in the colonies, the penalties were generally less severe. Whipping was reserved for the most shameful offenses, and limited to 40 stripes, lenient by English standards. Certainly our forefathers allowed room for improvement. In Pennsylvania the most horrible punishment for adultery, 21 lashes, seven years in jail, and the imprinting of an "A" on the forehead, was for third convictions. The 40 stripes administered for lying in the Massachusetts Colony were given to eighth time offenders.

Although treating moral offenses as crimes was a natural result of the predominant influence of the church, it was also, in part, an economic necessity. Life in the early colonies was hard, and sexual misbehavior could place a strain on a community which was already living near the edge of survival. In 1658 Maryland's punishment for bastardy became more severe because of the increasing number of servant girls who were becoming pregnant. In the eighteenth century, when life was a bit more comfortable, laws on adultery and fornication were relaxed, with a view mainly toward fixing responsibility for illegitimate children.

In some instances hardship worked to increase freedom. In mid-seven-

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teenth century England many prisoners complained of long confinement before trial. The Bay Colony, little able to afford any loss of manpower, in 1648 set down strict laws governing incarceration before trial. No one able to provide bail was to be imprisoned unless the alleged crime was capital or contempt in open court.

Through the time of the Revolutionary War, the agrarian colonies in the south and mercantile societies in the north were able to police themselves by civilian effort. Large scale uprisings, such as Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia, and the mob violence at the time of the Revolution, necessitated the use of the militia, of course. But for the most part communities remained sufficiently small and unified to maintain order by nonprofessional, unspecialized forces.

The movement from communal self-protection to professional law enforcement was an urban development in the United States of the nineteenth century. The term "police" derives from the Greek polis, or city state. Here, as with colonial law, Americans constructed from the English model.

In both England and colonial America towns were patrolled at night by watchmen, whose duty was to look out for fire and to be on guard for street disturbances. Originally an office held in rotation by property owners, in England, at least, it had degenerated into a paid job held by impecunious substitutes, frequently drunk or elderly. For in eighteenth century London there was a trend among the city's wealthy to move to the suburbs to escape the filth, noise and crime.

These undesirable conditions were the result of the early industrial revolution, or at least the enormous population boom which preceded it. London grew from approximately 500,000 in 1700, to more than one million in 1800, an increase which gave rise to entire neighborhoods, who, through the combined forces of poverty and alcohol, could not police themselves, and were just the most in need of policing.

Watchmen and constables proved woefully inadequate to combat city crime. In 1776 the Lord Mayor of London was robbed at gunpoint, and within the following decade both the Prince of Wales and Duke of York were mugged. Riots were not uncommon, and the brute force with which the military suppressed them did little to improve the government image in the darker parts of town.

The Metropolitan Police of London were established in 1829, in the midst of a general reform movement. Under the direction of Home Secretary Robert Peel (the origin of the nickname "bobby"), the new force was organized as a group of professional civilians, initially decked out in silk top hats,

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swallow tail coats and white duck trousers, and armed with only truncheons. As was to be expected, they were not greeted warmly in certain quarters. The first casualty was the same year, 1829, to a Constable Grantham, who was unfortunate enough to step between two Irishmen quarreling over a woman. The three of them turned on him, beating him to death. Many people in London then thought he got what he deserved for interfering in other people's business. But affairs improved for the British bobby, and in 150 years of service only about 100 policemen have been murdered in the course of duty in England.

Following the London example, American cities in the mid-nineteenth century founded police departments. First was New York, in 1844; then Chicago, 1851; Cincinnati and New Orleans, 1852; Philadelphia and Boston, 1854; Newark and Baltimore, 1857; Washington, D.C. 1861.

Like most institutional changes, the establishment of a professional police force was not accomplished by fiat, but by a series of adaptations to changing social conditions. In the 1820's American cities were just beginning to experience the population growth London had seen the century previous, and the attendant crowding and poverty. Moreover, this decade began the long period of European immigration which swelled United States cities with groups whose customs and values were different, and often at variance with those of the dominant group. The population of Boston, for example, grew from 49,000 in 1822 to 120,000 in 1846, largely due to the influx of Irish immigrants, whose views of liquor consumption, hardly coincided with those of the Protestant middle class.

While serious crime was not much in evidence at this early time, incidents of drunkenness and assault were emerging in the well-travelled sections of town, much to the distress of the respectable citizens. To deal with these nuisances there was an appointed constable, who was paid, but not well, and 18 night watchmen who hauled disorderly persons before the justice of the peace the following morning. None was stationed in South Boston, where there were no jails and the likelihood of attack while bringing the prisoner across the river was too great to risk (3).

In 1823 Major Josiah Quincy created the post of Marshall of the City, a

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(3) Roger Lane, *Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967. Most of the information here on nineteenth century Boston is from Lane's book.

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kind of super constable who headed a department of internal police and reported directly to the Mayor and Council. The first to serve in this post was a Harvard graduate, Benjamin Pollard, who had at his disposal a total contingent of two deputies and a horse. During the period of the 1820's and early 1830's criminals posed a far lesser threat to public welfare than poor sanitation and unsupervised traffic in crowded streets. So this first "police department" acted mainly as a Board of Health, handling fire inspections, traffic control as well as issuing summonses for misdemeanors.

The social conflicts of the next decade lent impetus to the movement for a standing professional force for dealing with civilian crime. In 1835 an anti-Catholic mob burned a convent to the ground, forcing the city fathers to allot an unprecedented $1,500 (normally a yearly expenditure) for special constables.

The following year an attack on abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison required special measures, and in 1837 there was the Broad Street Riot, which began as a collision between a company of volunteer firemen and an Irish funeral procession (4).

By the time Boston came to recognize a formal police department, constables who acted as police were earning $2 a day, about twice the average for a laborer. In 1853 night watchmen were given warrants as policemen, paid $2 a night as members of the "Watch and Police Department." Police divisions were created at this time also.

When the first Boston policeman, Daniel Estes, was murdered in 1848, police began informally to arm themselves with guns. But the Civil War brought acceptance to military trappings, and in 1884 police were issued arms at public expense.

The war was also responsible for forcing a metropolitan police force on the nation's capital. Until 1861 Washington had been able to survive with the traditional watch force, but the mass immigration of Union troops and camp followers created a climate of disorder the Congress chose not to ignore. In this year a bill was passed creating the Metropolitan Police District of the

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(4) Volunteer fire companies were the cause of much disorder. In Philadelphia, their practice of starting fires, then competing to be the first company to extinguish the fire and claim the most loot has led James Q. Wilson to maintain, "It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the Philadelphia policemen were created in part to control the Philadelphia firemen." "What Makes a Better Policeman," *The Atlantic*, March, 1969.

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District of Columbia and establishing a police force under the direction of a five-man board of commissioners. As in the case of Boston, the first head of the police force was a college graduate and a lawyer, William Benning Webb, paid $1,500 a year to recruit and train a force.

Although soldiers and prostitutes attracted to Washington by the war were the direct cause of the formation of the metropolitan police force, the record of arrests shows that civilians, particularly Irishmen, far outnumbered the military personnel and ladies of the night in finding their way to jail (5).

With the notable exception of controlling the upheaval which accompanied the Civil War, the policeman throughout the nineteenth century dispensed social services at least to the same extent that he fought crime and probably more. The officer was an integral part of his neighborhood community, one who had benefitted from ward system of city government dominated by ethnic groups. His job had been awarded to him by one of his own kind, and he, in turn, took care of the newest arrivals. Operating soup kitchens, finding jobs and homes for the destitute were among his most important duties.

According to James Q. Wilson in "What Makes a Better Policeman"(6), the decisive movement from peace officer to crime fighter as the primary view of the policeman's role came with Prohibition. This unpopular and widely ignored piece of legislation confronted the cop on the beat with a choice of pestering otherwise law-abiding citizens or leaving himself open to charges of corruption. Wilson explains that in 1931 the presidential Wickersham Commission, having investigated violence in the United States, published a report blaming police and politicians for these conditions. This claim was more politic than discussing more basic causes, such as unemployment and Prohibition.

Throughout the twentieth century there has been a breakdown of community government in American cities, due partly to a conscious reform movement. Eliminating the old Tammany Hall form of government may have done away with a certain amount of corruption, but it also robbed the

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(5) Philip D. Jordan, "The Capital of Crime," *Metropolitan Police Journal*, Washington, D.C. 1975.

(6) Wilson, *op. cit.*

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city poor of the ability to help their own by providing jobs (7).

While these changes in city politics were occurring, there was a shift in population to urban areas. The population increase from 1950 to 1960, 28 million, was entirely in cities, and much of it represented urban migration of blacks (8). Discussions of the problem of crime in this country have centered around these people.

In the often made comparisons between the United States and Great Britain, the existence of a large non-white proportion of population is cited as a main factor in the historically higher crime rate here. The extensive use of firearms is also given as a reason for differences between criminal rates and police behavior in the two countries. The British bobby, at least until recently, has been fairly certain that no lawbreaker he chases will carry a deadly weapon. In fact, British constables have traditionally refused to carry guns on the grounds that without the weapons they are likely to have greater public support and less inclined to incur appropriate retaliatory action (9).

The fact that British society is relatively homogenous, while American mixed racially and ethnically is naturally important in understanding how their law enforcement officers behave. The Briton has always been in a better position to act as a peace officer, maintaining order by dint of persuasion, warning, and with fewer arrests. He is considered more disciplined, more courteous than the American.

If American policemen exhibit uncertainty in how to treat the offender, they probably reflect a national ambivalence toward the system of criminal justice, of which the policeman is only a part. While people here may demand on the one hand that a tough stand is taken against lawbreakers, on the other they often find it difficult to apply this to the specific case. In 1925 the editor of the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* explained that in England the public understands the meaning of crime, punishment and the combination of the two. "They accept the major and minor premises and apply the con-

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(7) Daniel P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*, New York: The Free Press, 1970.

(8) Paul Mundy, "The Implications of Population Trends for Urban Communities," *Police and Community Relations: A Sourcebook*, A.F. Brandstatter and Louis Radelet, eds., Beverly Hills: Glencoe Press, 1968.

(9) Michael Banton, *The Policeman in the Community*, New York; Basic Books, 1964, pp. 113-114.

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clusion. Here, in America, somebody is bound to challenge all three (10).

Yet the similarities are as significant as the differences. United States police spend most of their time not enforcing the letter of the law or even making any partial attempt to do so. Forcing drunks to move on their way, dispersing potentially troublesome gatherings of juveniles, is as much a part of the work of a police officer here as overseas. Catching dangerous criminals may have first claim on glamour and publicity, but the routine tasks of handling motor vehicle violations and domestic disputes are the nuts and bolts of a cop's job. This is not to minimize their importance. The FBI Uniform Crime Reports for the first eleven months of 1975 show that a total of 26 local, county, state and federal law enforcement officers were killed by criminals while answering calls for these two kinds of disturbances.

It may be that in some ways Britain is simply trailing behind the United States in developing the conditions which lead to a high crime rate. Crime is on the rise all over the world, and in 1962 the rate of increase in England and Wales was 11%, compared to 5% in this country. The mobility which has characterized life here has come later to Europe, and with it less desire for community approval (11).

There, as here a burgeoning crime rate has caused many people to take a new look at conditions behind it. The old view linking crime to poverty has been reexamined, and if not discarded, at least greatly revised. In 1968 Lord Justice Widgery, addressing the National Bar Association, pointed out that the welfare state in Britain, bringing as it has improved living conditions for the poor in his country, has been accompanied by a steady rise in crime. He concluded that poverty and lack of privilege are not in themselves causes (12).

At times the relationship between poverty and crime can be inverse. This seems especially true of crimes against the person, assault and sexual offenses, and property crimes such as arson and pickpocketing (13).

Not only the causes of crime, but the application of punishment has

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(10) Paul Bellamy, Address before Ohio Welfare Conference, October, 1925, *Selected Articles on Criminal Justice*, James P. Kirby, ed., New York, 1926.

(11) Banton, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-10.

(12) Leon Radzinowicz, "Economic Pressures," *Crime and Justice*, Vol. 1 New York: Basic Books, 1971.

(13) *Ibid.*

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come into question. For many years rehabilitation has been the ideal of the judicial system, and continues to be so in some quarters. The maxim, "Let the punishment fit the criminal," rather than the crime, seemed to be the byword of many twentieth century penologists, and has been criticized by civil libertarians as well as those who place a high value on law and order. Writing in the American Mercury in 1924, Harry Elmer Barnes expressed the sentiments of many who would cure criminals of their antisocial inclinations (14)

> The important question will be the menace of the individual to society and the possibility of so treating him as to eliminate the menace. If it is found that his personality is such as to make it permanent and serious, he will be segregated for life, whether he has committed a multiple murder or stolen a bag of peanuts. On the other hand, many a person who has committed a murder will be committed to a sanitarium for treatment with expectancy of his ultimate release to a life of freedom, if his motivating compulsive disorder is of the type which promises recovery under treatment.

This kind of psychiatric tyranny is as unfair to the man who steals the bag of peanuts as it is to society at large which must suffer the misdeeds of the released, but insufficiently rehabilitated murderer. The goal of rehabilitation should not be dismissed out of hand, but a balance must be struck between the interests of the offender and those of his potential victims.

It seems that the scale is now tipped in favor of the serious offender, a fact demoralizing to law enforcement officers. Revolving door justice, as it has been termed, is an enormous frustration to cops who see committing a crime on the street a person whom they hauled in for the same offense shortly before. Much of the apparent leniency of the courts can be attributed to inefficiency, and some reforms recently proposed by William F. Buckley Jr. are worth consideration (15).

In 1900, with a population of 1,900,000, Manhattan had six felony judges. In 1973, with its population dropped to 1,500,000, the borough supplied 30 such judges, who are faced with an insurmountable backlog. Perhaps more meaningful for an understanding of the problems of the law enforcement officer is the fact that in 1970, of the 94,000 arrests made,

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(14) Bellamy, *op. cit.*

(15) William F. Buckley Jr., *Four Reforms: A Program for Today*, New York: Putnam, 1973.

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only 522 went to trial.

Referring to the tendency of the Supreme Court to overturn criminal convictions on the grounds that the defendant had not been properly advised of his rights, Buckley maintained, "The recent convention that evidence must be excluded because it was obtained by unlicenced means is not reasonable. Its sole justification is to punish the policeman or prosecutor for having stolen a base . . . However zestful the constable, to rob him of a conviction is not to punish him."(16)

The columnist suggests that the jury trial, which takes anywhere from three to ten times as long as one before a judge, be eliminated as a requirement for petty offenses carrying penalties under six months, and that, as England did in 1967, states here do away with unanimity requirement in place of a 10 vote verdict.

At least two of the Supreme Court reversals (Escobedo, Miranda) were based on the assertion that the defendant had not been properly advised of his rights to an attorney and to remain silent. Buckley proposes that the accused in a murder case be brought before a magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest, advised of his rights then interrogated, the procedure recorded on a video-tape which could be introduced as evidence at the jury trial. This procedure would obviate the defense attorney's objection that subtle (or overt) forms of torture had been used in the interrogation.

Obviously the police as well as the courts have received criticism, particularly for the role they played in the civil disorders of the 1960's. Charges of brutality were leveled at police in cities across the country, and subsequently studies were done to find out what determines a cop's attitude toward the public.

In *Minorities and the Police: Confrontation in America*, authors David H. Bayley and Harold Mendelsohn published results of a study of the Denver police department. Officers were tested against the rest of that city's population to measure anomie and authoritarianism. On both scales they tested lower than average, less given to despair of their situation and less rigid in their judgment of others (17).

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(16) *Ibid.*

(17) David H. Bayley and Harold Mendelsohn, *Minorities and the Police*, New York: The Free Press, 1969, pp. 1-34.

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Not too surprisingly police were found to be more conservative than the average. After all, as Bayley and Mendelsohn observed, the policeman's basic responsibility is to preserve the status quo. He is trained to look for incongruous situations or individuals, and is a family man with a stake in the community.

When police departments were first formed in the nineteenth century, the salaries of officers relative to those in the laboring trades from which the men were drawn were high. Police officers are still largely the children of working class families, but today the pay compares much less favorably, and the number of applicants is down (18).

James Q. Wilson, writing in 1969, maintained that most people who considered the problem of the police officer were agreed on high salaries, more extensive training, better legislative and administrative guidance and more modern equipment. Yet decisive action is rarely taken, because of a public failure to comprehend the dual role of the policeman, serving both as a crime fighter and peace officer. (19). While the soaring crime rate indicates that there is a need for the officer to act in the former capacity, to enforce the letter of the law and do his best to find and apprehend criminals, there is still a wide area of responsibility in which the police officer must act without a specific law to guide him.

A considerable part of the problem of police administration arises from this dual role, for the administration of a department of law enforcement officers differs substantially from that of peace officers. If all which is required of a policeman is that he arrest each and every lawbreaker within his ken, then the administrative task is fairly simple; an efficient, well organized bureaucracy should do the trick. Duties can be refined and compartmentalized and each officer will become a specialist.

To some extent, this has happened all along, not without bad side effects. In the 1800's police detectives in charge of criminal investigation were on the take by official sanction. In cases of larceny, they were supposed to find the thief in return for a portion of the recovered goods. Later, when they were placed on the public payroll, their status was enhanced in

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(18) Seymour Martin Lipset, "Why Cops Hate Liberals and Vice Versa", *The Atlantic*, March, 1969.

(19) Wilson, *op. cit.*

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the public eye at the expense of the patrolman on the beat. The man who captured the crooks was more highly regarded than the one who performed the more important task of maintaining some kind of order in the community (20).

Some specialization has occurred in response to modern technology. In Atlanta, for example, it was the practice to use police officers as school crossing guards, giving officers an opportunity to become acquainted with neighborhood children under cordial circumstances. This seemingly trivial duty formed an important link in police-community relations, according to Herbert Jenkins, Police Commissioner in Atlanta from 1947 (21).

Mass automobile ownership following the Second World War broke this link, by forcing policemen into the onerous job of traffic patrol at morning and evening rush hours. Economic necessity forced the department to hire women part time to help children across the streets.

In spite of the fragmentation of police functions attendant upon modern life, there is evidence to support the assertion that the policeman is fundamentally a professional. All the high ranks of police exercise the same authority as a patrolman, that of (in this country) a specially armed citizen, paid to protect others (22).

Not so much enforcing the law, but maintaining order requires discretion and quick judgement on the police officer's part. Whether a particular drunk should simply be told to move on, or whether he should be detained for his own protection is a question only the cop on the beat must decide. A group of people on the sidewalk may be a friendly gathering or a brawl in the making, and each cruising officer must choose, risking the hostility which a poor judgement can arouse.

Police collectively must decide how to allot man hours and equipment nowhere nearly sufficient to the task. Unlike other professionals, they cannot pick and choose among their clients, but must take all, and the worst, comers.

There is also some discretionary power granted to policemen in the area of law enforcement, regarding drug law offenses. Like cops of the Prohibi-

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(20) *Ibid.*

(21) Herbert Jenkins, *Keeping the Peace*, New York; Harper and Row, 1970.

(22) Banton, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-108.

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tion era, officers today can be damned if they do and damned if they don't. Many citizens realize that the use of certain drugs is widespread, and find cops who arrest for it unnecessarily harsh. Yet the feeling that the police who consciously overlook law breaking are somehow corrupt is pervasive. This ambivalence is something police must accept until the public and legislators choose to take a logically consistent position on the matter.

Police failure to enforce unpopular laws also represents a reluctance on their parts to run counter to public sentiment, and place themselves at complete odds with everyone else. Unless they have support within a neighborhood, they will not succeed in their primary duty of maintaining order. At times when police seem corrupt by not enforcing to the letter, they are simply being more realistic that many other people.

While there is need for each police officer to retain a certain autonomy in order to exercise his judgement on the beat, this sort of professionalism need not preclude departmental reorganization and centralization. A British Royal Commission concluded in 1962 that the optimum size for a police force is 500 or more, in order to provide sufficient distance between officers of different rank and insure that private associations will not affect work efficiency. In Britain at this time there were only 44 forces meeting this requirement, but only 13 forces with fewer than 100 men. The United States on the other hand, then had 40,000 separate departments, many with memberships under a few dozen (23).

Obviously, both geography and state government militate against central control in this country as it exists in Britain. But a quick glance at the Uniform Crime Reports indicates that the greatest increase in crime recently has been in the suburbs, where, not too surprisingly, the population growth has been. In these areas with hundreds of tiny departments of often no more than a half dozen men there is a great need for stronger organization and communication. Suburbs which ten or 15 years ago were composed of genuine small towns have been assimilated into the greater metropolis, with all its appurtenant crime and disorder.

American police as we know them are a modern development, an outgrowth of urban life. In smaller, more homogenous communities which predominated until this century, each able-bodied citizen could assume respon-

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(23) *Ibid*, pp. 88-89.

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sibility for law enforcement as the need arose. Familiarity and economic necessity in towns and villages worked against the commission of crime, by making community approval desirable, and collective disapprobation hard to avoid.

The city limited the ability of the average citizen to act as constable, bringing, as it did, greater freedom of movement, more apparent poverty, and more continual disorder. Police departments were created to meet the problems of early city life, among which crime was not always the most pressing. The policeman was often a kind of catch-all public servant, charged with enforcing public sanitation and health codes, supervising traffic and running soup kitchens. The idea of a policeman as primarily a crime fighter did not evolve completely until well into this century, given much impetus by the Prohibition era gangster.

Even today, with all the talk of crime and law enforcement, most police work still falls within the time-honored duty of preserving the peace. But the dramatic rise in crime in the United States, as in the rest of the world, may well be an indication of the difficulty of maintaining order in societies increasingly crowded, ever more mobile. It may be necessary now to place greater emphasis on crime fighting efficiency, and to this end to improve the criminal justice system, giving police assurance that much of their work need not be in vain, and that dangerous criminals will be removed from society.

It may be that drastic reorganizations of our police departments are in order. Many are too small to perform efficiently, especially those just outside the jurisdiction of metropolitan police departments. And although I am not advocating a federal police force to handle most crime, former Atlanta Police Commissioner Herbert Jenkins has made an interesting point in *Keeping the Peace*.(24) Since city police departments spend much of their time enforcing federally imposed laws, it may be no more than reasonable to ask the federal government to reimburse them for these activities.

However, much we reinforce the ability of law enforcement agencies to combat crime, we must not lose sight of their original and still important role, that of citizens specially empowered to maintain order. This will require that we continue to allow the policeman to exercise his own judgment in his daily rounds, and that we treat, and expect him to behave, as a professional public servant.

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(24) *Op. Cit.*

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BRITISH POLITICS AND THE PRESENT DILEMMA OF THE BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY

Rhodes Boyson, M.P.

The British Conservative Party is at a parting of the ways which could take it to dominance of the British scene or to an obscurity only rivalled by the period 1846-1874 after the Party broke between Peel on one side and Lord John Bentinck, Lord Derby and Benjamin Disraeli on the other.

The Left swung into political, if not electoral, dominance in Britain in the late 1930's before World War II. It then seemed to many people that capitalism could not cure massive unemployment and that state planning could increase industrial production and the national standard of living without any loss of liberty. The swing of the pendulum to the Left even affected the thinking of the Conservative Party.

A total war always increases the move to collectivism and Britain was probably more totally organised economically in World War II than any other country. Thus it could be easily argued that if to win a World War one required collectivist organization then a similar organization could win the peace. This move was increased by the fact that most Conservative Ministers in Churchill's World War II coalition Government were involved in Ministries fighting the war while very many Labour Ministers were at seats of office where they could plan the advance to socialism in health, welfare and education.

The 1945-51 Labour Government brought in the welfare state with little opposition from the Conservative Party. Most of the plans for the welfare state had been prepared by the Wartime Coalition Government. Winston Churchill could make dramatic speeches about individual initiative and self help but the ground was prepared for socialist advance.

By 1951 when the Conservatives came back to power the Party had changed considerably. There was acceptance of the welfare state, even a competition to make it more effective and the argument was simply as to whether capitalism or socialism would create the additional wealth to make the welfare state that much more effective. There was a bonfire of economic control but Winston Churchill's slogan of 'Set the people free' did not extend to welfare.

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Nevertheless up to 1957 government was cut back, there was some denationalisation and there was a reduction of taxation. But the moral case for the free society was rarely put and the slogan 'You've never had it so good' grew out of the emphasis not on the virtues of the free society but on the general enjoyment of increased production.

Without a basic philosophy the Conservatives lost direction by 1957 and it was only a matter of time, despite the overwhelming Conservative victory of 1959, before the Labour Party returned to power. The case for the free society on moral grounds had gone by default.

From 1964-1970 we had a Labour Government which by international standards was moderate in its advance to socialism. Yet the people did not like it and in June 1970 Mr. Heath and the Conservatives won a slender but effective victory. They had fought on a 'Selsdon' manifesto of reduced government, no prices and incomes policy, lower taxation and more free enterprise and personal responsibility. On this they were voted to power for our people did not want socialism.

Yet within three years the Heath Government had reneged on all its promises. Bureaucracy and government interference were increased, a prices and income policy was introduced and taxation began to mount again. The people rightly decided that if they were to have socialism they might as well have a socialist government, and in February 1974 Mr. Wilson and the Labour Party returned to power, gaining a greater majority in October of that year.

The Conservative Party is thus faced by a clear choice – is it to out-socialise the Labour Party or is it to offer a genuine version of a free society linked with its historic appeal to stability and patriotism.

Britain is grinding to a stop under oppressive taxation, over-government and socialism. The welfare state is particularly unpopular with the working classes since its abuses are seen all around them. The Conservative Party cannot compete with the Labour Party in filling the public feeding trough but only in an alternative philosophy of self-help, pride, responsibility and patriotism.

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher's election as leader of the Conservative Party was widely welcomed and every one of her instincts is right and this is important in an instinctive party. The public, however, are not yet convinced after the turnabout of the 1970-74 Heath Government that a Conservative Government under her would do the things which they want on the free enterprise and personal responsibility level. There is still a gap of credibility since almost all the important figures in her Shadow Cabinet served under Mr.

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Heath from 1970-74.

The Conservative Party must not only indicate its direction but spell out its policies for reduced taxation, for denationalisation and for less government. It must prepare imaginative plans for the educational voucher in education, the sale of council houses, and the increase of choice in health care. Faced by a Labour Government set on creating drab egalitarian socialism the Conservatives must spell out the virtues as well as the rewards of a free society.

The Conservative Party must also ally with the demands for increased emphasis on defence, law and order and national interests. The present Labour Government is stripping our defence and they are the appeasers of the 1970's making a farcical support of a mythical detente an excuse for cutting our forces below the safety level.

On law and order there is great concern about terrorism and the lack of safety in many of our city areas. The Conservatives must be again the defenders of the Queen's peace and this also means to 85-90 per cent of Britishers the return of capital punishment for terrorist murderers. The line of public safety in Britain is crumbling before the permissives, the pseudo-experts and the 'well-wishers'.

If the Conservative Party does identify with the deep urges of our people again then it could win 500 seats at the next General Election. If it does not it will slip into the position of Scandinavian Conservative and Centralist Parties – always in opposition. This will be a pity because the British electorate is still probably one of the most Conservative on earth. They have not left us, we have left them.

The matter is urgent because the present Labour Government is moving Britain rapidly towards a collectivist totalitarian state. We are approaching a position where only men with union cards can get jobs in state industries, when all land use is under government control, when private property is destroyed by taxation policy and there is no choice or independence in education or medicine. The need for the Conservative Party to regain its soul was never more urgent but the time is very limited.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS TO UNION POWER



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CAN BRITAIN AVOID A MARXIST FUTURE?

Stephen Haseler

The old future

Twenty, even ten years ago the political future of Britain seemed set within narrow and predictable parameters. Certain basic assumptions about the future, which now seem either foolish or complacent, were generally held without question. There was no serious expectation of the political disintegration of the United Kingdom itself; Northern Ireland was quiet and Scotland and Wales solidly behind the traditional party politicians at Westminster. No sensible or important person predicted a future of political violence for Britain; there were no political killings in Ulster, no bombs or assassinations in England, no hijackings, no violent picketing and no one died as a result of political demonstrations; the students on the more radical campuses were a little unruly but mostly peaceable in their demonstrations and sit-ins – there was no equivalent to attacks upon academic freedom and authority such as have occurred at the University of Kent, the North London Polytechnic and other institutions of higher education in the seventies. No intelligent observer forecast a future of political lawlessness; no local councillors felt the need to break the laws of their Parliament, no political strikes were called, there were no seizures of factories or plants, and squatting had scarcely been heard of. There was no prospect of an electoral decline in the stable two party system; it would have been unthinkable for third parties at general elections collectively to poll as much as 24 per cent of the vote. Only an eccentric would have forecast a future for political extremism: the Communist Party was weak in the trade union movement, the ultra-left groups had no influence on local Labour Parties, the National Front was not even conceived of, there were few extremist newspapers and what did exist had minute circulations. It would have been thought impossible for independent candidates, who had been dropped by their political parties, to walk away with by-election victories. Such abuses of the constitution as a national referendum and even a temporary abandonment of Cabinet collective responsibility would have been unimaginable. Anyone who suggested that a woman would be leading a major political party, and the Conservative Party at that, would have been laughed out of serious political circles. No one envisaged a

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social malaise so profound that the Archbishop of Canterbury would consider it necessary to launch a nation-wide campaign to save Britain from a 'drift towards chaos'. Talk of a future dictatorship in Britain, of left or right, or of military involvement in politics, or even of a realignment of Parliamentary politics would, only a few years ago, have been dismissed out of hand.

Those who expressed themselves about the political future did so within the narrow confines of conventional party debate. Those on the left saw Britain evolving towards the Swedish model – a social democratic policy with a mixed economy, high growth, increased public expenditure and liberal values. Quintin Hogg, the most reflective Conservative thinker of his generation, saw a potential future of Britain that was stable, based upon the rules of excellence and law, and possessed of a large and flourishing private enterprise sector.

The debate between the parties never strayed from futures that were in any way outside the social democratic consensus. Conservatives saw Britain adjusting to a new world role without an Empire but within the European Community. In this new setting Britain would remain tolerant, free and prosperous. Labour leaders saw a future with more justice and equality, and with political freedoms intact, which would be created out of an ever-growing economy that was envisaged as a permanent feature of the British future; in fact, economic growth was a prerequisite for most of the social changes demanded by those on the democratic left of British politics. The two-party system was expected easily to contain any temporary strains that might be placed upon the Parliamentary system and the mock party battle in the House of Commons, with 'ins' and 'outs', easily to soak up whatever unpleasant passions for political extremisms might emerge from time to time.

This, then, was the old future, a future that was to be buried and laid to rest as the tensions of the sixties and the convulsions of the seventies wrenched British politics from out of the past; whatever medium-term future is seen, it possesses few of the political characteristics of a flourishing, prosperous and liberal democracy. There is, unfortunately, no Swedish or West German or American or Australian future immediately in store for Britain. It remains to be seen whether Britain will have to deal with a marxist future – of one variety or another.

The fragility of Britain's democratic defences

Of course Britain still retains powerful defences against a marxist totalitarian future; yet at all points those defences are weaker than at any previous time.

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The first defence is obviously Britain's history. The comforting fact is that no country with, even broadly, Britain's social, economic and political history has yet gone marxist. The countries of the western tradition, including all the industrialised nations of Western Europe, are in no sensible way analogous to those nations that through internal revolution have already established lasting communist regimes. Russia, China, Cuba and Yugoslavia have so totally different historical experiences as to rule them out as automatic prototypes for future political development in the west. Most of the satellite nations of Eastern Europe were seized by Soviet military imperialism and had little experience of the western democratic tradition. The Czechoslovak experience is more problematical. This relatively advanced industrial nation experienced, both before and after the Second World War, a western-style democratic life. It is still a matter of some doubt whether Czechoslovakia, of its own volition and notwithstanding sophisticated internal intrigue, would have gone communist in 1948. The threat of Russian military intervention was, probably, decisive. Twenty years later, of course, actual Russian military intervention destroyed by force the reappearance in Czechoslovakia of the western tradition.

Britain's democratic tradition, like that of its Western European neighbours, could be decisive as a defence against a marxist take-over; but with political institutions weakened, traditional liberties eroding, the political establishment increasingly unsuccessful and unpopular and the very unity of the Kingdom under threat, the mere fact of Britain's democratic tradition cannot, of itself, be guaranteed to save the country from a future revolutionary situation out of which could come a communist regime.

The second defence against a marxist regime in Britain is the weakness of the British Communist Party, the nation's most disciplined, ruthless and politically sophisticated revolutionary grouping. Not only is its membership minimal and falling at less than 30,000, but its Parliamentary representation is nil. This, on the surface at any rate, compares favourably with both France and Italy where mass communist parties have established significant numbers of seats in the legislatures. Also, the Communist Party of Great Britain has to contend, on the extreme left, with various marxist trotskyite groups which frustrate its tactics and long-term strategy by offering a similar, yet fractured, appeal to those amongst the working class who are willing to listen.

All this, of course, is a superficial analysis of the strength of the British Communist Party, although one much in evidence as the 'official view' of the political establishment. It is superficial for three reasons. First, the relatively small membership of the Communist Party tends to hide its actual influence.

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This influence is achieved by the strategic position its members have achieved in some of the major trade unions. Also, we must add to the cadres of the Communist Party thousands of other marxists or 'socialists', active within and without the Labour Party, who share virtually identical views with the communists. Even if the total real 'membership' of the Communist Party is only, say, 40,000 this still represents enough disciplined cadres to take over a state in a revolutionary situation. The Bolsheviks in 1917 represented an even smaller percentage of the total population.

Another reason for the superficiality of the thesis of Communist Party weakness is that a nation does not need to possess a mass Communist Party in order to further communist aims or to bring about a communist regime. A comparison of France and Britain will illustrate this point. It is often remarked that France is near to the brink of a communist government because not only is there present in French political life a mass Communist Party, but this Communist Party often aligns itself in electoral pacts with socialist parties in order to win elections. For instance, in the Presidential election in 1973 the electoral alliance of Communists and Socialists came within a hair-breadth of winning the Presidency for the Socialist candidate Mitterand. In other words, a 'coalition' of left-wing parties and politicians, some communist, some marxist, some 'Socialist', some social democratic, came together with the right and centre parties in order to contest power in the state.

Essentially the same situation may be seen in Britain. When the Labour Party contests elections it too represents a coalition of albeit secret communists, open marxists, open socialists and open social democrats. The Labour Party that fights British general elections is composed of as wide a coalition of views as is the 'popular front' that fights French general elections. The only important difference between the two situations is that in France, and Italy, the mass Communist Party is out in the open and Communists and consequently the left-wing vote is split between Socialists and Communists and cannot shelter under a respectable, historical social democratic party. In fact, because of Britain's peculiar 'umbrella' Labour Party, which hides from public view many of the disparate elements within it, marxism – without the help of the Communist Party – gets a higher vote at elections than would otherwise be the case. The actual size of the Communist Party becomes irrelevant to the issue of the potential communist threat.

If it was sensible to believe that the electoral alliance between Socialists and Communists in France in 1973 posed a potential threat to the democratic system there, then it is no less sensible to believe that the election of a Labour government, with its 'coalition', 'popular front' nature, poses Britain

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with the same potential, possibly even actual, threat. It might be expected to move, and indeed has moved, British politics and the ruling group in the state that much more to the left. It might be expected to include, and indeed has included, in the government men and women with marxist views and with political associations essentiality subversive of the democratic process.

The French parallel can be slightly misleading in this connection. The 'popular front' came near to electing Mitterand as President, but it might have been difficult to sustain in government any open marxists. The nature of the Fifth Republic's constitution is such that the government, although appointed by the President, can only be sustained by agreement with the assembly, in which at the time of the 1973 Presidential election there was a non-marxist majority. The Assembly might have turned out a government that included communists or marxists even though the President may have been a Socialist. In a sense, therefore, Britain is more open to marxist influence at governmental level than is even France. Not only does the 'respectable umbrella' of Labour allow the 'popular front' to get enough votes to form an administration, but the constitution of the country does not allow the legislature to distinguish between social democrats, socialists and crypto-marxists as governors of the state. All ministerial appointments are determined by the Prime Minister and the only way he can be overthrown is by toppling the whole administration, an unlikely event as long as the ruling party retains a majority in Parliament and its essential unity as a party.

A third 'defence' against a marxist regime taking power in Britain that is often proffered by the complacent is the politically conservative nature of the British armed forces and the notion that they represent some ultimate kind of longstop against revolutionary political change. This argument is superficially compelling, because it is obviously true that the British military, unlike that say of Portugal, has not been interpenetrated by marxists or marxist ideas. The political opinions of the top and middle-ranking soldiers in Britain, in so far as they can be ascertained, vary from right-wing high Tory to social democratic. It is hardly conceivable that any soldier above the rank of Captain shares, even secretly, the political opinions of the Communist Party or some of the ultra-left groups. Many, quite naturally as in most armies, must feel a distaste for politicians of all colours. What anti-Parliamentary sentiments do secretly exist within the private breasts of the officer corps are no doubt those of the right-wing variety – not fascist in any sense, but rather those of traditional disciplinarian military autocracy.

The political opinions of the leaders of Britain's armed forces are, however, almost wholly irrelevant to the matter of speculation about any future

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political role for the military. First, unless there develops an unexpected change in policy the British military will remain unconscripted and small in numbers. It is virtually inconceivable, in these circumstances, that the military could successfully intervene in British politics to the extent of running the state themselves during a situation of high political tension such as a general strike. They could, perhaps, just about help to maintain some law and order but they certainly could not run essential services in the face of organised resistance. Secondly, the British military has a powerful and ingrained non-interventionist mentality. So deep runs the view that it should only act 'in aid of the civil power' (not necessarily the 'democratic power') that it is still probable that it would carry out the instructions of the 'civil power' irrespective of its political colour; and the 'civil power' would, of course, even after some revolutionary change, not in any circumstances describe itself as 'communist' or 'marxist'. Other labels, probably 'democratic' or 'socialist', would be used.

Two caveats should immediately be inserted into this general thesis. First, the 'civil power' would have to possess political legitimacy for us to assume that the military would unquestioningly carry out its order. In a situation in which the 'civil power' had by-passed the democratic process, say by lengthening the life of Parliament by a repeal of the Quinquennial Act, then the attitude of the military might be different. Everything would probably depend upon the extent to which the political rulers could establish in the public mind the semblance of 'constitutionalism' and continuity and stability – it would theoretically be possible for an elected government to discover a 'plot' against it, or even to engineer a military move against it, which could mean the postponement of elections until the situation had been stabilised. Secondly, the military could surely not be expected to carry out absolutely any action that the 'civil power' demanded of it. There might arise a situation in which a particular course of action would simply be technically impossible, as in the case of army intervention in an industrial dispute where either large numbers of men or a degree of technical expertise might be needed which would be beyond the capacity of the armed forces.

All this must lead us to the conclusion that the British military is not nearly as 'political' as many, particularly on the ultra-left, may think. Whatever the political views its officer corps may privately hold, they pale into insignificance when compared to the long, inveterate non-interventionist traditions of the military since Cromwell.

Another 'defence' against marxism often proffered by the complacent is the strength of the British middle class. It is suggested that no country with

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so powerful a middle class could possibly go communist. Of course, Britain has a numerically larger middle class than any country that has hitherto become a communist state* and the social, political and economic power of the 'middle' and 'upper' classes will always be a problem to the putative revolutionaries who want to establish a worker's state.

However, there are reasons for doubt as to the ultimate resistance that the British middle class might offer to dramatic left-wing lurches within the political system. First, the middle class of the seventies is far less militant in defending itself against trade union pressure than it was in the twenties. For instance, during the general strike of 1926 the government counted upon a wide degree of support from the middle class, particularly the younger elements, in breaking the strike. Yet during the industrial conflict of early 1974 with the miners the middle class seemed confused, apathethic and generally immobilised as an effective fighting force. Of course, the Conservative government decided not to take on the miners in an industrial sense – we shall never know what the response of the middle class would have been in such an ultimate situation – but rather to appeal at political and electoral level for support in a general political campaign against the power of organised labour. Before and during the election of February 1974 it was widely assumed by opinion-formers that any government that held an election on the issue of 'who governs the country, unions or government?' would win a decisive victory and could at very least count upon the almost total electoral mobilisation of the middle-class vote. As it turned out, no such support was forthcoming; evidently large, surprisingly large, numbers of middle-class voters deserted the Conservatives and voted for the easier option of the Liberal Party. There is some evidence that in February 1974 the Conservative working-class vote held up more effectively than the middle-class vote. In

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* Various estimates have been made by sociologists of the percentage of the British population that can be described as 'middle-class'. Ryder and Silver, in *Modern English Society*, suggest, on the basis of the Registrar General's classification, that the 'middle class account for just over 30 per cent of the occupations' (that is, defining 'middle class' as all non-manual workers). This squares rather neatly with the more important class self-images as described in Butler and Stokes, *Political Change in Britain*, p. 67; they list the self-images as follows: Upper Class 1 per cent, Upper Middle 3 per cent, Middle Class 25 per cent, Lower Middle, 4 per cent, Upper Working 10 per cent, Working Class 53 per cent, Lower Working 4 per cent.

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any event, the Conservatives managed to poll only 39 per cent of the total vote – a dramatic failure from their point of view in circumstances that, according to traditional political punditry, should have swept them back to power. The middle class seemingly showed little taste for battle. This may be partly explained by the fact that the middle class simply did not see February as an ultimate political situation in which their interests were threatened. Many small businessmen, for instance, saw the industrial conflict as a threat to their prosperity and argued for an end to the conflict with the miners in order that their business could get back to normal. Yet implicit in this view was a collective surrender to pressure from the miners. 'Give them the money, so that we can return to normal working and normal profits' was the widespread feeling. There was no particular sympathy for the trade unions amongst the middle class, save for a mild sympathy for those who worked in terrible conditions underground, but at the same time many rejected the notion of the need for a confrontation.

Some vitally important questions arise out of this apparent collapse of will on the part of the middle class in February 1974. If they did not even recognise the nature of the battle between government and organised labour then, will they recognise it in the future? If they did recognise the challenge being mounted to the system by the miners yet decided on a tactical retreat, will they ever stand and fight? Can a slow yet definite shift of power from Parliament to organised labour, and from the mixed economy to the command economy, ever be arrested if at any given point in time the middle class cannot be sufficiently united and mobilised to resist it? Will sufficient numbers of them, during any given particular conflict, opt for the quiet life, the easy way out, less 'divisive' policies, so that piece by piece, in the classical 'salami' method, the whole nature of British political life can be transmogrified into a system which the middle class themselves, together with virtually all the working class, will find repugant?

There is also the growing fragmentation of middle-class solidarity. As the British systemic crisis develops it is by no means certain that the middle class will coalesce in some predetermined imaginary sense around an anti-marxist banner. Different groups will, no doubt, act differently. For instance, managers of large establishments may conceivably settle for vastly increased nationalisation as long as they are guaranteed a place in the new order of things. In terms of status, and maybe pay as well, they will be as well-off running a nationalised concern as they are now managing a private concern. As this potential future for themselves dawns upon those with ambition, their resistance to the eventual end of the mixed economy may evaporate.

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Employers and managers of small commercial concerns, seeing the squeeze of their commercial viability leading to eventual bankruptcy and unemployment, may become 'poujadiste' in character, concerned primarily with their own small businesses but unconcerned with the general pattern of public and private mix in the macro-economy. Self-employed professional workers – lawyers, accountants, and the like – may not be particularly concerned with macro-political developments as long as they are not forced to suffer a loss in earnings. They can work for large public establishments just as well as for private ones; they may even prefer the long-term security of the big state client. Other professional workers who are employees may simply want job security and as long as the organisation for which they work remains in being they probably will not much care if that organisation is public or private; again, they may even see the public employer as offering more long-term security. Farmers will want a guaranteed living and will increasingly look to the state to secure that living for them. They might resist collectivisation, though that particular development is unlikely to be high on the agenda in any marxist take-over. Total land nationalisation might be on the agenda; of course this will be deeply resented, but much will depend on how it is sold to the public and whether or not the present private farmer can be guaranteed a living and, again, a managerial role instead of a proprietorial role – he may settle for a managerial role.

We must add to all this the increasing unionisation of some of the middle-class groups. This unionisation in one sense makes the middle class more militant and brings them into competition for resources with the manual workers. Yet at the same time it inexorably brings to an erstwhile 'individualist' middle class an understanding of the benefits of collective bargaining and industrial action. In a subtle sense it probably increasingly causes them to identify with the 'struggle' of other organised groups, therefore weakening their hostility to trade union action as a generalised concept.

Their loss of will in 1974, their fragmentation in the event of massive extensions of public ownership, and the increased unionisation of some sections of the middle class all detract from the traditional view that, somehow or other, this class will remain a grand bastion against extreme left-wing advance in Britain.

Yet another British defence against a new revolutionary order that is widely believed in is the large number of people of democratic belief who man the power centres of Britain's political, industrial, commercial, journalistic and civil service establishment. But the notion that these people will never forsake their political allegiance and their democratic principles, and

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will put up some grand fight against a new revolutionary order, is surely both naive and historically illiterate. Even a superficial reading of contemporary European history will show how shallow is the personal commitment to democracy by administrators of the state – in high and low positions – during a period of revolutionary change. Many 'good democrats' in Germany in the Weimar period served on within the state apparatus during the Nazi regime. There are many 'secret democrats' now serving the communist states of Eastern Europe. The threat of loss of job or of persecution or expatriation is inclined to turn 'men of principle' into apparatchiks of a new totalitarian regime.

For many decades Britain's politicians have not had to face any ultimate personal and moral challenge such as is provided by these examples. However, the responses of some British politicians to recent and unprecedented challenges to representative government are not good omens for the future. A politician who serves on in office after his policy has been defeated in Cabinet, a civil servant who serves government of differing political complexions even to the point of implementing policies with which he privately disagrees, a journalist who curries favour from whoever happens to inhabit 10 Downing Street, an industrialist who changes sides and serves on a nationalised board – such examples of personal weakness may also be portents of the sorts of general acquiescence from leaders that a new political order could hope to achieve. Much more ominous has been the acquiescence of many of the British political and administrative establishment in the breaches of the democratic constitution that have occurred in recent years. How far along the road to the end of the democractic state would the politicians who could *for whatever reason* support infractions of the constitution – the referendum, indemnification of law-breakers, ministerial attacks upon judges, detention without trial, surrenders to political strikes – be willing to travel?

Yet another supposed defence against a marxist regime in Britain is the fact that the nation belongs to the western economic system. It is without doubt the case that no member of the OECD has yet gone fully communist. It is also the case that huge economic pressures would be brought to bear on any nation that looked as though it might be on the point of leaving the western economic system. Nevertheless, the western economic system is not what it used to be; its cyclical dislocations are greater than at any time since the war, its financial structure more rickety, its source of cheap raw materials more endangered, its economic relations with the communist world more interdependent and, most important of all, the political and defence under-

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pinning of its economic structure less resilient.

In these circumstances it is now at least conceivable that a major Western European nation, say Italy or Britain, could see it to be in its long-run interest to resist the economic pressures of the western system to conform politically, particularly during a period when the western system itself is undergoing profound change.

Let us take a prospective economic scenario for Britain and see how membership of the western economic system, hitherto unchallenged from within the nation, could become a subject of debate and internal division. At some point in the future, mainly because of continuing balance of payments deficits, the British people will either have to produce more or cut their standard of living. As there is little likelihood of a production renaissance the British will be faced with reducing their standard of living. This reduction might take a number of forms, two of which will be urged upon Britain. At some point its western partners will insist upon either a higher level of employment or the rigorous self-discipline of an incomes policy, or both combined. Both high unemployment and an incomes policy will result from or coincide with a monetary squeeze.

Of course, such a dramatic lowering of living standards will only be introduced by our present breed of politicians when it becomes absolutely necessary, when there is a run on the pound that can be stemmed only by a loan from the western system. There will, of course, be conditions attached to the loan and those conditions will inevitably add up to an insistence upon cutting the British standard of living to a level consistent with the nation's output of goods and services.

It is at this point that voices will be raised against bowing the knee to such impertinent demands from foreigners; powerful internal interests, probably including the *Tribune* Group and the TUC, will discover all manner of 'foreign' conspiracies against Britain – 'Bankers' ramps', 'Gnomes of Zurich', and the like. Some may even go so far as to blame the whole capitalist system for this attack upon the British worker's living standards.

Some will argue that no action is necessary; that the pound should be allowed to sink and that, by implication, inflation should be allowed to rise to hyper-proportions. Others, the more serious left voices, will argue that a cut in living standards is necessary but that this should be achieved, fairly and 'justly', by rectifying the balance of payments by import controls and what will amount to a siege economy. In this highly explosive economic situation the amount of import controls needed will be on a greater scale than ever envisaged before and will make the 1964 import surcharge look like

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free trade fanaticism. The call for import controls will be allied to an end to luxury imports, rationing at home, strict control of the outflow of capital and all the measures necessary for a controlled, siege, socialist economy. If the nation is to take a cut in living standards, the argument will proceed, then it should be done in a planned, socialist way so that the 'broader backs carry the greatest weight'; the British should not succumb to vicious foreign pressure to 'screw the weak'.

Whether or not the orthodox solution to a western economy that is overspending and in balance of payments deficit prevails, an influential body of opinion will grow, backed no doubt by a degree of popular support, offering an economic strategy which, for the first time, could imply Britain's withdrawal from the western economic system. If this body of opinion, backed as it would be by the TUC, were to prevail, then it is at least conceivable that Britain could move by stages away from the western economic system into a sort of limbo – and then even, in certain circumstances, into the other Comecon orbit. Massive import controls and controls on the outflow of capital would certainly be contrary to the rules of the Common Market and could lead to retaliation by other western nations. It is also conceivable that, whether Britain was in or out of the Common Market, the western economic system would refuse to adopt a tolerant, wait-and-see attitude whilst the country got its house in order hoping that after a short period it could resume its place amongst the economically interlinked economies of the west. Britain no longer represents such a large portion of the western trading system as to make its partners tolerate, for the sake of the west, a unilateral renunciation of the rules. If the west as a whole were to cut Britain off from the western system, and rearrange itself to live without Britain as a member of the western trading area, then Britain would be in such a desperate economic position that its eventual absorption into Comecon would cease to become fanciful.

If Britain remains within the western economic system it is unlikely that an overtly marxist government could come to power in Britain. Yet it is by no means certain that Britain will remain for all time within the western economic system. Although there are powerful forces within Britain which, for political reasons, would like to see the country within the 'socialist commonwealth', it is the sheer force of events – the weakness of the west, the crisis of the British economy, the potential internal responses to that crisis – that may shatter the nation's relations with the economies of its western partners. It is at the point of economic crisis that the political aims of those who want Britain out of the west and 'objective' economic circumstances may together

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conspire to get Britain out. In such dire contingency a marxist regime in Britain would seem a likely and, indeed, appropriate political development.

It is not therefore membership of the western economic system that in itself precludes a marxist take-over in Britain; rather, the marxist state could be hastened by the political developments in Britain that the constraints of the western economic system could bring to the fore. In other words, the west may make demands upon the British that they may resist; in so resisting Britain could then, willy-nilly, be drawn towards more 'socialist' solutions to its economic problems and more 'socialist' politicans to carry them out. These 'socialist' economic policies could inevitably slowly remove Britain from the western system. The odds must still be against such developments, yet everything will turn upon the response of the British to the severe cut in their living standards that cannot be far off.

Just as British membership of the western economic system cannot be assumed for all time, neither can a British commitment to NATO. Just as the western economic system will not be able, in certain circumstances, to stop Britain leaving it, neither can NATO guarantee the nation against a government coming to power that is revolutionary in nature and either neutral or pro-Warsaw-Pact in terms of foreign policy.

To believe that NATO can defend Britain against itself is to assume two things. First, that under certain circumstances a British government, threatened by an internal development which it could not control, would call upon NATO to send in foreign troops to defend that government's existence. This, frankly, is unthinkable. There is no political grouping in Britain today anywhere near the reins of government that would even contemplate the use of foreign troops to impose its political will. Secondly, it is almost as inconceivable that any government of another NATO country would agree to its troops being used for internal political reasons in Britain. No European country would consider it for a moment and the United States, following its humiliation in Indo-China, would be highly unlikely to countenance the use of American soldiers to strike-break or maintain law and order in a 'friendly' western country. The Americans might certainly be willing to supply materials to any other western government that asked for them, although even this policy might increasingly come under attack from the forces of isolation in the American Congress and amongst the American people.

It must be remembered that NATO is not a supranational military organisation which can intervene in the internal politics of its member states. It is, rather, a voluntary association of sovereign nations for their mutual defence. No one power, or collection of powers, can stop another if it wishes

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to leave the alliance. Indeed De Gaulle effectively withdrew France from NATO, and both Greece and Turkey have, by turn, threatened military withdrawal from the alliance without incurring the slightest possibility of intervention by NATO forces to force those governments to change their minds. Of course, France, Turkey and Greece were not in the process of going communist at the time of their disillusionment with NATO; yet even if they had been, it is doubtful whether any NATO military intervention would have occurred. What would have been more likely, in the event of these nations being seriously threatened by an internal marxist take-over, would have been covert CIA action to help the non-revolutionary forces. Yet in the one NATO country that has looked like going communist since the inception of the Alliance, namely Portugal, the CIA would appear to have been conspicuous by its absence at the key moment, so debilitated had it become by the time of the revolutionary changes in Portugal.

It is demonstrable, then, for all who will allow the demonstration, that every one of the traditional defences against Britain becoming a revolutionary marxist state is weaker today than at any time in the country's history. External pressures, membership of NATO or the western economic system, are but dust in the balance when compared with the state of what internal defences remain. In today's world political complexion of a western nation is virtually the exclusive property of that nation itself. Whether or not Britain becomes a marxist 'people's democracy' will largely depend upon the resolution, discipline, ideological coherence and, perhaps, luck, of the contending political and economic forces that are now at work within Britain itself.

If the defences against revolutionary change in Britain are weaker than many imagine, then there are also certain underlying factors that may be positively edging the country towards the totalitarian precipice.

First, there is the deteriorating international situation. Neither the American guarantee to Europe as a whole nor the unity of the West European peoples looks at present very promising. The decreasing credibility of the American guarantee to Western Europe after its debacle in Indo-China could lead, over a number of years, to an even more obvious 'Finlandisation' of the European wing of NATO. This process would make the modern European forces of appeasement more attractive political commodities. A new 'detente mark two' mentality could emerge amongst the political establishment of Western Europe through which the present vigilance against potential Soviet expansion might turn into a shameless acquiescence in eventual European neutrality as between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this eventu-

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ality an appeasement of Soviet power would be reflected in an appeasement of internal marxism, both of which could even be seen by the ultra-left as guaranteeing Britain's security abroad.

Of course, a united, federal Western Europe, if it were to come about, could maintain Britain within the western system by replacing the American guarantee with a credible and effective Federal European guarantee – a guarantee backed up by nuclear power. Yet this type of Europe, as opposed to the loose EEC, now seems chimeric. Such a tight political and defence union, which would amount virtually to a new nation, could be brought into being only by the defeat of the immense nationalisms which are still predominant in most of the major nations of the European Community. It remains doubtful whether the French, at least, would ever agree to such a merging of sovereignty as would be needed to create a new super-Europe. The strategic power of the Soviet Union will therefore continue to impress and frighten each individual European nation for the foreseeable future and consequently gain for the internal extreme left forces within each of these countries a political and psychological lever on power.

Hand in hand with the deteriorating European situation walks, certainly as far as Britain is concerned, the daunting prospect of a mass proletarian political movement, which will be completely different in character from the present British Labour Party. Britain is after all the most 'proletarian' of any European nation; its working class is not embourgeoisified, as it is in West Germany and the United States; its trade union movement is more industrially and politically powerful than that of any other European nation; also, organised labour in Britain has not been split historically between Catholics, Socialists and Communists. This emerging mass proletarian movement may soon rid itself of its present social democratic leaders and in that eventuality it will set up shop with the title 'peoples' socialism' in the window.

Such an emerging proletarian movement will not be able to secure a majority at elections; popular resistance may be expected to such open marxism. However, as time passes, the economic system which will, presumably, still be declining, will become more and more unpopular and 'peoples' socialism' more and more palatable to more and more people. By that time the proletarian movement will be much more powerful in Britain than in any other European nation. It will possess two key ingredients which will be missing elsewhere. First, there will no large Communist Party to frighten people, as in France and Italy. Secondly, the proletarian movement will have on its side the forces of nationalism and conservatism. Its nationalism will feed upon the resentments of Britain's continuing association with

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Europe and the country's continuing inability to compete abroad. Its conservation will consist of all those instincts of the British people that refuse to face up to reality – the proletarian movement will warn against wasteful and divisive confrontation between government and unions, it will deplore attempts to cut living standards and it will propagandise against rising unemployment; it will also reject redeployement of manpower from ailing, unprofitable industries to potentially successful concerns.

The conservative face of the emerging proletarian movement will be profoundly attractive to all those who will set their faces against change and believe that a British renaissance is impossible. They will argue that the country can carry on very much as at present – no need for massive redeployment or temporary unemployment as the state can take over ailing industries; no need to deflate or impose incomes policies as balance of payments deficits will be dealt with by the siege economy; no need to work harder – the problems of productivity and underinvestment will be solved by a nationalised enterprise strategy involving greater trade union participation and control.

The twin pillars upon which British marxists will try to build their 'peoples' republic' are the military and diplomatic pressure of the Soviet state (which even they will not particularly like, but will argue that the country should yield to) and the emerging proletarian movement at home. It remains to be seen whether the weak defences against the marxist future that the British possess will completely crumble if and when the time comes.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

John M. Murphy
United States Congress

In October of last year I chaired a delegation of US Members of Congress who had served in the Korean War on a return visit to the Republic of Korea. Our mission was to survey the military preparedness and the economic progress of South Korea since that war and to report our findings to the Speaker of the House.

I have described the military situation in Korea elsewhere;* in this essay I should like to discuss briefly the history, the problems, the successes and the future prospects for economic development in the Republic of Korea.

At an in-depth U.S. Embassy briefing for our Congressional delegation by a variety of U.S. officials, Korea was universally characterized since 1965 as an "economic miracle."

Aside from its own internal discipline and intelligent planning, Korea's economy was given its impetus by:

1. United States aid;
2. A high rate of Japanese investment; and
3. Purchases of goods by the United States from the Republic of Korea related to the war in Vietnam.

Examples of government policies that have helped Korea's economic conditions in the long term include such programs as promoting limited birth rates to the purposive maintenance of high prices to Korean farmers for rice as an incentive to increased production. By stabilizing the population and by raising the production of rice, Korea is now close to self-sufficiency in terms of its major food staple.

Although over half of the Republic of Korea's 34½ million people live in the industrialized cities – with a relatively high standard of living as the

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*See "The Military Preparedness of the Republic of Korea" (by John M Murphy) in *Korea in the World Today*, Council on American Affairs, Washington D.C., 1976. See also "The Korean Economy: Rapid Growth and New Problems" (by Robert L. Schuettinger) in the same volume.

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smaller Asian nations go — rural residents actually have done as well financially as their urban counterparts. In 1974, the average rural household income actually surpassed the average urban wage-earner household income.

Of immediate concern to the Korean economy, is the fuel crisis and the government has acted forcefully to encourage a reduction in fuel consumption. They have levied a 300% tax on gasoline prices raising it to $2.00 a gallon, discouraged private automobile ownership by a severe prohibitive tax, and instituted what is considered to be the most important form of energy conservation, which is improved heat control by Korea's industrial establishments.

Nuclear power plants in the Republic of Korea are one answer to independence from foreign fossil-fuel energy. One plant is under construction and should be in operation early in 1976. Another is under contract with Westinghouse and is pending approval by the Export-Import Bank. A third is under contract with the government of Canada and is also pending approval. Korean officials are hopeful of developing several more in the future.

The unemployment rate in Korea is at the 6% to 7% level of an estimated labor force of 11 million persons. This figure, however, includes completely unemployed persons with the definition of employment applying to those persons working as few as 18 hours per week. There are large numbers of these underemployed persons in the labor force which is currently, although temporarily, increasing at a high rate owing to the "baby boom" following the 1950 war.

Deputy Prime Minister Nam Duk Woo told the delegation at a briefing by the Korean Economic Planning Board that Korea was the most severely hit of any country by the oil crisis.

Imports of goods and services are equaled to nearly 45% of Korea's GNP which means that imported inflation has been severe. Korean growth has also depended on industrial exports which amounted to 25% of their GNP. This means that the worldwide recession has made growth much more difficult since 1973.

Deputy Minister Nam indicated import restrictions are being used to alleviate pressure on the government's balance of payments but the basic solution still lies in export expansion. Evidence of economic recoveries in the United States and Japan has given the government hope of a reduced foreign exchange deficit in 1976. The government hopes to move toward price stability in 1976 after inflation of over 40% in wholesale prices in 1974 and 20% in 1975.

The Korean Economic Planning Board has as its goal for 1976 a return to

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one digit inflation.

In terms of oil imports, Minister Nam informed the group that the bulk of Korean oil is imported by three foreign investment companies under long term supply contracts. Crude oil is imported from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait and refined in South Korea.

The United States has discouraged South Korea from outer continental shelf oil and gas development inasmuch as Japan and North Korea claim jurisdiction over the shelf. South Korea has tried to obtain agreements with Japan to explore the outer continental shelf, however, the United States will not allow South Korea to use its seismic equipment for fear of seizure of sophisticated items by North Korea.

A detailed prepared economic briefing was presented to the delegation which confirmed the U.S. Embassy's assessment of spectacular social and economic achievements by the Republic of Korea. Consider the following highlights:

**With a small land mass and meager natural resources, South Korea achieved one of the world's highest economic growth rates during the 1960's and into the 1970's. Ninety percent of its population is literate and its intellectual and cultural progress appears to have no bounds.

**Economically, Korea's gross national product increased from $2.3 billion in 1962 to $16.8 billion in 1974.

**Industrially, in areas such as shipbuilding, fertilizer production, iron and steel production, cement production, and even automobile production, increased output has multiplied in spectacular fashion.

**South Korea's dramatic expansion of trade is exemplified by the fact that exports increased at an average rate of 44.4 percent per year since 1962.

**In export structure and world markets, the amount of manufactured goods exported increased from 27 percent in 1962 to 90 percent in 1974.

**There have been equally significant successes in investment and savings, the attraction of foreign capital, in agricultural development, and the modernization and expansion of highways, rail transportation, Korean Flag freight vessels, power generation and communications facilities.

The following is a resume of the briefing given the delegation by the Economic Planning Board on October 27, 1975:

LAND AND POPULATION

The total land area of the Korean peninsula is 220,800 square kilometers. The area south of the De-Militarized Zone is 98,500 square kilometers. The country is largely mountainous: 67 percent of its land is forest and rugged terrains and 23 percent is the arable land in low-lands and river

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valleys. The population of the Republic of Korea is 33,459,000 as of 1974. This gives a population density of about 340 persons per square kilometer.

Korea, with the limited land area and natural resources, maintains a large pool of well-trained skilled labor.

Manpower resources, and an aspiration for national modernization and industrialization, have served as the mainspring of attaining one of the world's highest economic growth rates throughout the 1960's.

MAJOR ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN 1974

Surveying very briefly some major economic indicators of the Korean economy in 1974, *the Gross National Product was equivalent to $16.8 billion* and per capita GNP amounted to $501. Commodity exports reached $4,515 million, commodity imports were $6,468 million, and foreign exchange holdings as of the end of 1974 were $1,049 million.

The industrial structure having been steadily improved, the agricultural, forestry and fishery sector accounted for 25.3 percent of the GNP in 1974, the mining and manufacturing sector for 29.0 percent, and the social overhead capital and other services sector for 45.7 percent.

In terms of the industrial distribution of employment, 50.4 percent of the total labor force was employed in the agricultural, forestry and fishery sector, 17.0 percent in the mining and manufacturing sector, and the remaining 32.6 percent in the social overhead capital and other services sector.

1962-1974 ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS AT A GLANCE

During the past 13 years from 1962 to 1974, the Korean economy has made a remarkable development in all sectors with an ever-growing manufacturing sector and sharply increased exports.

Rapid economic growth during the past decade was characterized by (1) sustained high rate of growth, (2) structural improvement of industry, (3) increased investments and domestic savings, (4) export expansion (5) dynamic implementation of agricultural development programs and (6) expanded infrastructure. The Korean economy has thereby successfully completed major tasks for take-off and has set a stage for advancement into the next stage of higher development.

GNP AND GROWTH RATE

During the period of 1962 through 1974, the Korean economy has marked an annual average growth rate of 9.5 percent in real terms. During the First Five-Year Plan period of 1962 to 66, the country's annual rate of economic growth registered 7.8 percent. The growth rate was accelerated during the Second Five-Year Plan period with a high of 10.5 percent. The first three years under the current Third Five-Year Plan recorded an annual

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average rate of 10.7 percent.

As a result of sustained high growth, the Gross National Product increased to $16.8 billion in 1974 from $2.3 billion in 1962, and per capita GNP rose from $87 to $501.

IMPROVED INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE

Along with the quantitative expansion of GNP, there has been a significant shift in industrial structure. The percentage share of mining and manufacturing sector in GNP steadily increased from 16.5 percent in 1962 to 29.0 percent in 1974, while the agricultural, forestry and fishery sectors declined from 36.6 to 25.3 percent and social overhead capital from 46.9 percent to 45.7 percent.

Manufacturing sector development was also accompanied by the development of heavy and chemical industries. The percentage share of the heavy and chemical industry in the manufacturing sector increased from 31.4 percent in 1962 to 45.8 percent in 1974.

The manufacturing sector development resulted in sharply increased production of manufactured goods. Compared to 1962, the 1974 output of shipbuilding increased 116 times to 582 thousand gross tons; fertilizer production increased 21 times to 777 thousand metric tons; iron and steel production 23 times to 3.2 million tons in 1974 from 142 thousand metric tons in 1962; cement production increased 12 times from 790 thousand metric tons to 9.8 million tons; and automobile production from none to 30 thousand units.

EXPANDED TRADE

Another factor which contributed to Korea's economic performance is drastic export growth. Commodity exports increased by an average rate of 44.4 percent each year since 1962, reaching $4,515 million in 1974 against $55 million in 1962. Foreign exchange earnings including receipts from invisible trade totaled $5,353 million in 1974.

In order to meet the requirement for sustained high economic growth and expanded export, the country also imported commodities in 1974 valued at $6,468 million compared with $390 million in 1962. External payments including invisible trade totaled $7,615 million in 1974.

EXPORT STRUCTURE AND MARKETS

In parallel with industrialization, the share of manufactured goods in total exports increased from 27 percent in 1962 to 90 percent in 1974.

With expanded exports volume, Korean export markets have been steadily diversified to 119 countries in 1974.

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INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS

Rapid economic growth has been made possible by active investment activities. For the last 13 years, the ratio of investment to GNP has been steadily increased, marking 31.4 percent in 1974 against 13.0 percent in 1962.

The increase in the ratio of domestic savings to GNP was notable in particular. It increased from only 2.1 percent in 1962 to 17.8 percent in 1974, with domestic savings sharing greater portion in total capital formation.

INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL

The continued inflow of foreign capital has greatly helped Korea's rapid economic growth. Beginning in the second half of the 1960's, the inducement of foreign capital was in full swing. The annual flow of long-term loans and direct investments increased from $237 million in 1967 to $1,057 million in 1974.

As of the end of 1974, the cumulative total of $5,388 million in foreign capital has been introduced into Korea. The amount includes $2,984 million in commercial loans, $1,884 million in public loans and $520 million in direct foreign investments.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Along with industrial progress, the Government has taken important measures aimed at modernization of agriculture.

The efforts are reflected in the average rural household income which increased to 675 thousand won in 1974 from 68 thousand won in 1962. The average rural household income, which has steadily increased, surpassed the average urban-earner household income in 1974.

Programs for the development of agriculture have included water resources development, farm land rearrangement, increased supply of fertilizer, introduction of high-yielding seed varieties and high price policy for farm products.

Between 1962 and 1974, the area of rearranged paddy fields expanded 7.1 times, making 43 percent of total paddy fields rearranged as of the end of 1974.

The number of electrified rural households increased 4.4 times, with 59 percent of rural households electrified.

The area of irrigated paddy fields expanded 1.7 times to 85 percent of the total.

As a result of these efforts, rice production increased 1.5 times to 4.5 million metric tons, barley 1.2 times to 1.7 million metric tons, soybean 2.1 times to 320 thousand metric tons.

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EXPANSION OF INFRASTRUCTURE

To facilitate production of physical output, investments in infrastructure have been expanded in the past decade.

Compared to 1962, the road network increased 1.6 times by 1974, and the national road pavement ratio improved from 14.5 percent in 1962 to 37.1 percent in 1974.

The most obvious is the construction of express highways of 1,013 kilometers, bringing the entire country within a one-day travel zone.

During the period of 1962 to 1974, railroad network expanded 1.2 times and 334 kilometers of railroad lines were electrified.

In line with the expanded transportation requirement, the nation's cargo handling capacity increased 2.8 times to 28 million metric tons a year, together with the expansion of Korean flag freight vessels 12.5 times to 2.2 million gross tons.

Power generation capacity expanded 12.3 times to 4.5 million kilowatts in 1974.

Communication facilities have been steadily expanded, meeting the requirement of economic development. Local telephone lines expanded 5.6 times during the period of 1962 to 1974, and long-distance telephone lines 12.6 times.

PROBLEMS AND TASKS

In spite of the very successful records of development of the Korean economy in the past decade, Korea is not without any problems. The problems and difficulties became greater in recent years. The Korean economy in 1974 was subject to the same difficulties as the world economy was experiencing.

They have had to face business slow-down, increased unemployment, inflation, and a deteriorating balance of payments. Although they do not lose sight of their potential in the fog of current difficulties, the problems they have recently experienced require them to have a better equilibrium among growth, stability and international balance of payments.

INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1972-1974)

Despite the strains and difficulties imposed by the unfavorable developments of the world's economy, the Korean economy in 1974, which demonstrated a flexible and resilient capacity, registered a real growth of 8.6 percent, and it seems likely that major goals of the Third Five-Year Development Plan will be in large measure achieved by the target year of 1976.

The annual average economic growth rate during 1972-1974 was 10.7 percent, exceeding the 1972 to 1976 average annual growth target of 8.6

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percent of the Third Five-Year Plan.

Korea's commodity exports exceeded $4,500 million in 1974, or 129 percent of the amount set for 1976, while imports, valued at $6,468 million in 1974, at the same time, surpassed the 1976 estimate.

In line with the efforts to attain self-sufficiency in staple food grains, rice production in 1974 reached 4.5 million metric tons or 91.5 percent of the 1976 target, and power generating capacity in 1974 reached 4.5 million kilowatts or 7.5 percent of the target.

Expansion of the nation's heavy and chemical industries has also made steady progress. To cite an example, Korea's shipbuilding capacity reached 1.1 million gross tons by the end of 1974, or 34.6 percent of the 1.3 million gross tons targeted for 1976.

KOREAN ECONOMY IN 1975

In spite of the fact that international economic recovery has been slower than hoped, South Korea still expects to have 6.5 percent real growth in 1975.

GNP in 1975 is projected to increase to $18.6 billion, and per capita GNP to $547. The sluggish economic activities on the part of Korea's trading partners have continued to be constraints upon Korea's export performance, and commodity exports in 1975 are projected to amount to about $5.5 billion, only 15 percent higher than the 1974 level of 4.5 billion.

In spite of the government's various import saving efforts and measures, the sluggish exports will result in about 1.9 billion dollars current account deficits in the balance of payments, some improvement over 1974, but still very large.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Korea's balance of payments, which has shown chronic deficits in its current account, has, however, demonstrated a steady and continuous improvement in its structure over the past decade. The current account deficit, measured as percentage to the current receipts, was 52 percent in 1962. This ratio came down steadily over the decade to only 7 percent in 1973, when 300 million dollars' deficit was recorded in the current account. A generally accepted expectation was a balanced current account in the next few years.

The Korean economy having suddenly been hit by the international raw material crisis and world-wide inflation, the current account deficit in 1974 increased sharply to $2 billion, or 32 percent of the current receipts. The Korean officials we talked to, however, are firm in their belief that this is not a structural problem, but a temporary phenomenon.

With Korean exports growing faster than imports, together with the

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measures of the government to save imports, the current account gap is expected to be closed in the early 1980's.

FOURTH FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN

In spite of challenges and problems which were initiated in 1974 and 1975, South Korea plans to strengthen, consolidate, and refine its responses to the new situations and circumstances.

The Fourth Five-Year Development Plan for 1977 through 1981, on which the government has already commenced work, pursuing the basic development goals of growth, equity and efficiency, will aim at the consolidation of a more self-supporting economic structure, devote further resources and efforts to the achievement of equitable social and welfare development, and intensify technological innovation and socio-economic efficiency.

Although many of the Plan's sectoral targets require further refinements, these basic goals are a summation of fundamental national requirements.

OVERALL PRELIMINARY INDICATORS

Although it is difficult at present to make a precise projection for coming years, the general outlook is for better growth performance, stabilized price movement, and an improved balance of payments.

During the Fourth Plan Period, a very provisionally projected annual average growth rate is 9 percent. Population growth rate in 1981 is to be lowered to the annual rate of 1.3 or 1.5 percent. Greater proportions of investments, which are projected to be maintained at 28 to 30 percent of GNP, are going to be financed by increased domestic private and public savings.

With commodity exports and imports of around $12 billion at 1974 prices, the trade gap is projected to be closed in 1981, resulting in some surplus in the overall current account transactions.

Korean economic officials told us, in summation, that "In spite of the present difficulty of predictability and the lack of an overall favorable world economic climate, we will plot the most optimum course to our fixed point, that is, our national development. Toward this course which is not always easy, we need your cooperation and understanding."

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS:

I have concluded, and my colleagues on the delegation agreed with me during our meeting with President Park, that the following conditions in relation to South Korea can and will be met by the United States of America:

**The United States is not leaving and will not leave the Republic of

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Korea under existing conditions;

**The United States must bring the Republic of Korea Army to parity with the North Korean Armed Forces in terms of sophisticated weapons and weapons systems;

**When parity is reached, the United States will carefully watch and react appropriately to any further escalation of arms in the North, either internally or from outside sources;

**Finally, only by keeping the Second Division north of the Han River will we keep Kim Il Sung north of the DMZ.

While the recent world recession has not left the Korean economy untouched, on the whole, the Korean people have made truly remarkable economic progress against great odds and, on balance, the delegation is satisfied in the knowledge that 25 years ago they contributed to saving a country and a people that was well worth saving, and they are now firmly convinced that the United States must fulfill its commitment to the Republic of Korea to whatever limit is needed to sustain that nation.

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ITALY AT THE CROSSROADS!

Nerin E. Gun

Unless a political miracle occurs, the forthcoming Italian elections for a legislature will change the fate of Europe. The June solstice is expected to bring with it a new style "Front Populaire." The theory of "European dominos" could become a reality, possibly with no point of return. A Communist electoral victory would change the structure and the spirit of NATO. No matter what assurances the Italian communists are giving, and no matter what American diplomats are hoping: one can hardly imagine the U.S. 6th fleet moored in a harbour covered with red flags, or a communist Prime Minister declaring war on the Soviet Union! Such a victory would offer a serious perhaps deadly challenge to the European community. It would be strange for communists to accept directives from the Europe "of the ten" – until now opposed by the Soviet Union and its satellites – and strange for Europe to tolerate a communist-dominated government as a partner.

A communist victory would also force a turning point for American foreign policy; it would certainly end the cycle started with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the Berlin airlift.

The United States of America has been described as the "Godfather" of Italian democracy. If we ignore the facile excuse that the U.S. should "no longer be the gendarme of Europe," then the U.S. has a very special stake in the fate of Italian democracy.

Americans must abandon the illusion that a take-over by the Italian communist party would in some way serve the cause of democracy, even to the extent of inducing some countries behind the Iron Curtain to try a more liberal system of administration. The Italian elections are free only in appearance for the country has lived during the last two years in a climate of violence. People have been terrorized – and few realize how easily the Italian middle class is scared – by strikes, sabotage and desertions promoted and encouraged by the communist-dominated labor unions. These have ruined the economy of the land, encouraging a loss of confidence in democracy and more votes in favor of the communists. Once in power, will the communists – as they claim – really accept democratic principles, or would they

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eventually use force and intimidation, like Allende did in Chile? This remains to be seen.

Italy is a very young country. Its geographical unity dates from the 20th September 1870; but its political unity is still unfulfilled. Although the Kings of Savoy accepted democratic structures such as Parliament and a free economy, Italy remained essentially authoritarian, with power concentrated in a few hands, and its democracy was only a facade. The situation changed after the first World War, when the Crown lost its authority, but not in favor of a true democracy. The communists were even then working to implant a revolutionary regime, and were prevented from doing so when Mussolini and the Fascists saved the Crown and many of the new economic institutions but enforced a dictatorship. Until 1914, Mussolini was a socialist leader, but was expelled from his party because he opposed Italian participation in World War I. The Italian people still did not understand that tolerance is a basic ingredient of democracy. If you disagree with the majority, you may be ejected, insulted, beaten and sometimes even killed.

Millions of Italians accepted and helped fascism only because they were opportunists and did not want to take risks or suffer the consequences of opposition or neutrality. I believe that today a great majority of Italians who are cooperating with the communists have the same opportunist attitude. I always have the feeling, when watching a communist parade in Rome, that I have seen the same faces in the Piazza Venezia at the time Mussolini was acclaimed by *"les foules océanes"*, the delirious mob!

Fascism was not defeated by democracy or the lovers of freedom. The American invasion of Sicily was the main reason for the dismissal of Mussolini. He lost the confidence of his own party, on the memorable night, July 25, 1943. There was no popular uprising, no revolt, no real "resistance." Not one democrat, let along one communist, had anything to do with the end of fascism. The final decision was between Hitler and Eisenhower. Eisenhower won, and the Allied tanks conquered Italy, bringing with them an invisible passenger: democracy. Italy accepted democracy because of the American victory. If the tanks had been German, it would have remained fascist. If Soviet tanks had arrived first, Italy would have been communist, like Poland or Romania.

Today, after thirty years and more of tottering, wavering, staggering democracy – introduced, inspired, and sometimes even forced by, the United States (documents of the Department of State in Washington show that the Italian Constitution was partly written in Washington) this liberty is collapsing. Today we are defending its last remnants.

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Why? Why is a once prosperous, joyful, peaceful, dynamic, friendly country now the sick man of Europe? Because everything was too easy, too sure. The Americans supported Italian democracy with money and military protection. The successive Italian governments could safely be passive. The traditional political parties were lost in "combinazioni" contrivances, in bickering, in trying to outdo each other in doing nothing but to struggle to stay in office for as long as possible. With the exception of Alcide De Gasperi, politicians were mostly busy in concealing their mediocrity and their past. Italians see politics as a game: but they are masochists, and once they have built, they hurry to destroy. "Let Rome burn while we play the fiddle, they say. "We are not afraid of chaos, we thrive on it." Thus most Italians have declined to accept the blame for what has happened. They refuse to admit that they are primarily responsible for their own woes.

Today it seems that the Christian-Democrats have been in power too long. They are worn out, tired and corrupt. They are without imagination, divided, and wasting time and energies with palace cabals.

The Vatican, the traditional foe of communism, changed its attitude after John XXIII was seated on the throne of St. Peter. The new Pope sought to compromise with the Soviets externally, and with the Italian communists internally. Now Paul VI has changed his mind and mildly opposes communism because he wants to avoid the vote of a liberalized abortion law and is scared at the vision of red flags in Saint Peter's Square. Too late, the country is split and the minds are confused.

One can hardly discern whether the current political disorder is the cause of the contemporary Italian disaster or vice-versa. The vicious circle seems hopeless.In May 1976 the exchange rate on the open market in Rome was 1200 lire to the dollar. By November 1975 it was around 650. The gross national output dropped 3.7% in 1975 (to a total of 112,386 trillion lire). Industrial output fell 9.7%, total investments 24%, and fixed investments 12 per cent. The indebtedness of the administration rose from 5.4 trillion lire in 1974 to 12.4 trillion. This was due mainly to the vast increase of the amounts applied to salaries, pensions and bureaucratic waste. Unemployment increased to a level estimated at 1,100,000, and industrial capacity is being utilized at only 60 per cent. Inflation is over 18%.

On paper, the plight of the Italian economy may have similarities with the problems of England, and certain other industrialized countries. But Italy does not really belong to Europe; the country hangs on and tries its best to "look" normal, but this is not enough. The labor force is uncooperative, and red tape, uncollected taxes, shortage of probity, all contribute to

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the crisis.

Everyone is in some way to blame. The worker who strikes a day every week for political reasons, who keeps away from work because he wants to rest in the country or to go to a ball game resulted in 176 million working hours being lost in 1975. The leading Italian car factory, Leyland, was forced to close its doors because of absenteeism alone. The small businessman who cheats the revenue service, the wholesalers who leave their money abroad, the mailman unable to deliver a letter on time (postal delays are over a month) and the hundreds of thousands of little speculators crossing continuously over the border to sell their lire to a Swiss bank (20 million lire are deposited in foreign banks every hour) all are responsible.

Italians don't seem to be seriously worried about this paradoxical state of their nation, because until now, Uncle Sam has always taken care of things: foreign aid, loans, investments, Marshall and other plans. The idea was that the United States could not allow the Italian economy to go bankrupt for fear that the communists would take over.

Now, that the communists are likely to take over, what will they do? They could not expect dollars from Washington although they may try to get some, one never knows . . . The Soviet Union is unable to help them financially. Will the communists change the Italian mentality, force the workers to work, the taxpayers to pay their tax and the bureaucrats to be efficient?

Mussolini tried it and was not completely successful. Signor Berlinguer will face a dilemma – whether to use an iron hand and risk unpopularity or to accept compromises and share the blame for a situation which could only worsen. This is why he was so reluctant to agree to new elections.

Enrico de Berlinguer's grandfather fought with Garibaldi, and Berlinguer joined the party in his teens. His wife goes to mass every Sunday and Berlinguer goes with her. This looks very reassuring to the Catholic voters. Berlinguer's brother is a director of the Italian foreign ministry. Berlinguer lives in a luxurious building with its own pool and gracious grounds. The working masses do not seem to mind and the wealthy people hope that as a property owner Berlinguer will let them keep their own grand residences. We are told we have a new generation of communist leaders. In wartime France, Georges Marchais worked for the National Socialists in Augsburg and was praised by them for being an excellent co-worker. Are they sincere or are they playing a role? "They play a role," French President Giscard d'Estaing told me, "it is a new tactic to gain votes."

Nevertheless, Berlinguer is able and intelligent. After Allende's downfall,

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Berlinguer decided that he would not try to govern Italy with a narrow electoral margin. He invented the "historical compromise", an *entente*, an understanding with the leading Christian-Democrats, a sharing of power. Then, in due time, he would eliminate his collaborators, and consolidate his own totalitarian rule. Officially this soft approach is condemned by Moscow. However a few weeks ago, the *"New Times"* an influential Soviet weekly wrote:

"The Italian communists should not accept the responsibility of government if they get only a slim majority."

The communist party of Italy at the beginning of this year had one million seven hundred thousand members. It is the most important political formation in Europe and the most vociferous. It has also penetrated the army and the magistracy. Many Italian intellectuals are on their side. The most important Italian newspapers, such as *Corriere della Sera, Messaggiero, Stampa, Europeo, Espresso, Panorama,* are communist-infiltrated. Many of the party's supporters are opportunists as I have said, and the bulk of the workers and peasants have not the slightest understanding of or inclination to understand what the communist party wants or will do. They hope for a sinecure, a long paid vacation, the villa of the bosses, money for nothing, and perhaps even a shiny new uniform. They will be surely disappointed.

The Italian communists pretend to be free to criticize Moscow, and they do it occasionally with regard to small issues that are without importance. But they remain silent over Cuba, and hardly mention the bread lines in the Soviet Union. Unlike Marchais, Berlinguer went to the Party Congress in Moscow. And if one enters the headquarters of the communist party in Rome, on the Via delle Botteghe Oscure, the impression one gets is that there is absolutely no difference between this communist party and all others. There we see the same dark corridors, the same secrecy, the same discipline, the same oppressive surroundings as elsewhere in communist countries. We are not in a sunny Rome but in a grey Prague or a cold Warsaw.

"I do not believe anymore in monolithic communism," said one U.S. Senator to me. He may be right. There are differences between Moscow and Bucharest, between Moscow and Peking, between Bucharest and Tirana. But what kind of differences? Everywhere the borders are closed and the peoples are denied their liberties; everywhere life is difficult, sometimes hopeless. Will Italian communists be really different?

Many Americans think so. They argue that without the help of Soviet tanks, a communist government cannot remain very long in power. They

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forget to remember that Cuba does not have Soviet tanks. And are the Soviets that far away from Italy? Tito is not immortal and with Tito gone, Soviet power may very well stand poised for action at the border near Trieste.

Other Americans hope that with a little experience in government the communists will be submerged by the difficulties and give up. I hardly think so. Italian communists are not without experience. They already control the local governments of 6 provinces, almost half of continental Italy, and dominate the municipalities of most of the great cities. They have proven themselves to be capable administrators – in any event better than their predecessors.

Unfortunately, most Italians believe, regardless of their party affiliations, that the Lockheed and other scandals are part of a deliberate conspiracy by a Machiavellian United States. They believe in the existence of a design – whether attributable to the CIA, to the Pentagon or to the White House is anyone's guess. What matters is the assumption that the crisis has been deliberately aggravated by Washington. The Italian communists pretend that the monetary crisis which erupted last January was triggered by the Americans to endanger the Italian economy and they are believed by the mass of the people. Only Ugo La Malfa, the leader of the Republican party thinks otherwise; saying: "The whole idea is nothing but fantasy politics."

There is also a tendency to believe that the situation in Italy will be used as a tool by candidates for the American presidency. Italians have a fondness for self-importance. They are of course persuaded that the United States is responsible for everything that happens, and that their own politicians are mere puppets in the hands of the Department of State.On the other hand, many communist voters believe that the Soviet Union will do everything in its power to help them, that they will eat caviar for breakfast and that their wives will be kept warm in sable or blue fox furs, and that at the first sign of trouble, Brezhnev will dispatch his armoured divisions across the Alps to protect Italy from another American invasion at the Gulf of Naples.

President Ford and Mr. Kissinger warn against the participation of communists in the government but they conveniently forget that American diplomacy has encouraged cooperation with the Reds in the first place. How could Italy give another interpretations to "Detente" and to the "Helsinki agreements"? US Ambassador Volpe, now in a very unfortunate position, had many meetings with communist leaders. At the same time he closed his doors to persons with anti-communist opinions. The Rockefeller Foundation in New York invited Segre, the Foreign Policy adviser of Mr. Berlinguer, and thus possibly the future foreign minister, to a meeting in

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New York, and to a planned encounter with Kissinger and a possible meeting with Ford. This move was foiled, due to the intervention of several U.S. Senators. A few days ago, Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski was widely quoted in European publications as promoting a dialogue with the Italian communists. "Let's not get panicky," stated Mr. Brzezinski, described by some as the would-be Kissinger of Presidential candidate Carter. He predicted that a communist Italy will give headaches mainly to the East. "The Europeans will help Italy to avoid a catastrophe. We may get along perfectly with a communist Italy."

An imaginative policy — with normal partners, with anyone but the communists. History has shown beyond the slightest doubt that communist parties are not like others. They never played the game . . . They never betrayed their allegiance to the Soviet Union. Remember the pact signed by Hitler and Stalin. French communists sided with Germany and Russia although their country was at war with Germany. Their leader Maurice Thorez deserted the French army and took refuge in Moscow. The same thing happened with the Italian leader Palmiro Togliatti. To believe that the Italian communists, in exchange for their participation in the government, will agree to cooperate in a diplomatic offensive against the interests of the Soviet Union is a political folly.

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EDWIN J. FEULNER, JR.
Congress and the New International Economic Order
Washington, D.C., The Heritage Foundation, 1976

The monograph reviewed here treats the growing issue of the economic "Cold War" that has recently characterized the relations between the industrialized countries of Europe, America and Japan versus those of the vast "third world" states of the southern half of the globe. Specifically, the author takes a minority position in the academic world as he compares the increasingly harsh demands of the "LDC's" (less developed countries) for preferential trade and aid benefits against what he sees as a growing reluctance in the U.S. Congress to accept these demands and the assumptions upon which they have been made.

Edwin J. Feulner, Jr. can write as a student of both international economy and of Congress. He is Executive Director of the Republican Study Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives, has formerly served on the staff of the Secretary of Defense, and has studied economics at the London School and at the University of Pennylvania, where he received the M.B.A. Feulner has co-authored the book, *Trading with the Communists* (1968) and has been a frequent contributor to a variety of journals on topics dealing with the United Nations and with international economics.

The focus of Feulner's analysis is the evolving viewpoint of the LDC's that a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO) is a necessary prerequisite for the economic transactions of the future. This viewpoint has recently been expressed most forcefully in the halls of the United Nations and, over time, has developed a momentum and a philosophy all its own. It is, in fact, today an economic ideology which has affected the perspective of the overwhelming majority of U.N. members. It was against the ideology that former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, spoke out so eloquently. The ideology of the LCD's, however, did not arise suddenly in the presence of Moynihan. It has evolved over a considerable number of years and, as Feulner points out in his book, achieved a high point in the recent Seventh Special Session of the United Nations held in September 1975.

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Prior to that session, the viewpoint of the NIEO was the result of a number of special global economic sessions that were convened to discuss specific issues between the industrialized nations and the LDC's. By the time of the Seventh Special Session, an elaborate philosophy of economic conduct had already been advanced by the LDC's and a list of demands to meet their "rising expectations" had been submitted. The essence of the new economic ideology was the assumption that the past and present "exploitation" policies by the developed nations had caused the underdevelopment of the LDC's and that the industrial states had both a moral and an economic obligation to assist the poorer countries, even if that assistance meant self-sacrifice by the rich states. As articulated by the many spokesmen of the third world, the new doctrine has embraced the notion of an economic equalitarianism of global dimensions combined with an historic psychosis of guilt for the alleged sins of the colonial era. As expressed in the Seventh Special Session and in the several meetings that preceded it, the NIEO would be based on such traditional liberal shibboleths as "equality" and "self-determination", in addition to the modern socialist's conception of governmental regulation. In practically all of the demands for reform of the existing economic system, as Feulner carefully points out, the notion of private capital aid and investment is either dismissed totally or barely acknowledged as lip service to an apparently out-dated and villainous system. Typical of the demands that reflected such beliefs were those advanced at the Seventh Special Session that called for expansion of new cartels in raw materials, the right of the LDC's to default on loans, the right to take over transnational corporations, massive technology transfers from the industrial countries to the LDC's and 1% of Gross National Product (from the developed countries) for investment in the LDC's.

Feulner analyses the NIEO through the perspective of his association with the U.S. Congress and through his personal belief in the superiority of the economics of the private sector. He is able to demonstrate the political nuances involved when so many of the LDC's sharply criticize the United States while expecting, at the same time, to received significant U.S. concessions in foreign aid. Feulner demonstrates why the Congress, including liberals and conservatives, from both parties, has grown increasingly disillusioned with financial aid to the LDC's. Since the receptivity of Congress to a specific aid program determines its viability, the viewpoint of Congress is crucial to the ideology of the LDC's. In their excessive accusations against the industrialized countries, and in their own sharp and sometimes bitter demands for a NIEO, the poorer countries of the southern world may well

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force the United States into a dark and suspicious mood of isolationism that would benefit neither themselves nor the international economic system from which they must derive their own rewards. Feulner's book should be a sober reminder of the political pitfalls involved when a campaign of economic rhetoric goes beyond the margins of political prudence.

In his final section, Feulner offers his own appraisal, assisted by neoclassical economists such as Peter Bauer, of the economic character of the proposed NIEO. The author is articulate, precise and devastating in his rejection of the underlying positions of the "new" economists. He traces the economic growth of four comparable Asian societies (Korea, Burma, Taiwan and Ceylon), showing how the two that consistently pursued the ideology of economic nationalism and socialism (Burma and Ceylon) have in every category failed to measure up to the growth patterns of the other two. Beyond these examples, he demonstrates theoretically the economic and pragmatic irrationalism of the NIEO. He shows convincingly the illogic of the "exploitation" theme and the fallacy of state control doctrines. At bottom, Feulner concludes, the idea of foreign aid itself has been taken as an economic "given" much too long and by far too many people who have unwittingly and unconsciously accepted the imperatives of the aid doctrine. Using the powerful examples of the industrialized states themselves, he refutes both the necessity and the sufficiency of the modern concept of foreign aid. No major state of the "old" order depended upon foreign aid for its own expansion or industrialization. Even the more successful states of the present era have benefitted primarily from traditional ideas and practices for their own economies.

In pointing out such facts, and in his sustained critique of the doctrine of the NIEO, Feulner has made an important contribution to contemporary economics. The message, however, will probably fall on deaf ears. The concept of the NIEO is much too advanced and too ideological to retreat in the face of either the cold facts of economic reality or upon the prudential advice of a political veteran. Nevertheless, one can hope (against hope) that Feulner's message would have a serious impact upon those in the United Nations who cling to economic myths. Perhaps unfortunately for them, the U.S. Congress is already beginning to get the message.

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EVANS, M. STANTON
Clear and Present Dangers: A Conservative View of America's Government
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1975.
HOLT, MARJORIE (editor)
The Case Against the Reckless Congress
Green Hill Publishers, Ottawa, Ill., 1976.

These two books, taken together, provide a useful and timely restatement of the political principles held by American conservatives at the beginning of our third century as a nation.

The brilliant and articulate chairman of the American Conservative Union, Mr Stanton Evans, has given us a cogent analysis of why modern liberalism has failed and why conservative alternative approaches in both domestic and foreign policy would have more likelihood of success. His book is really a basic textbook in American government as it ought to be and as it would be if the underlying principles of the founding fathers were being implemented today.

Drawing upon his wide knowledge of the philosophy of American conservatism, Mr Evans applies that philosophy to approximately twenty major public policy issues. He demonstrates the advantages of our federal system, with states serving as counter-forces to omnipotent government and as laboratories for experimentation and progress. Throughout this book, Evans stresses his underlying assumption that most social goals are better achieved by relying upon the natural forces of evolution and the market economy rather than government regulation and "social engineering."

Evans, for instance, examines the growing problem of inflation which has plagued all democratic countries (and non-democratic as well) in the post-war years. He points out the main source of inflation, namely, Big Government's constant desire to do more than it can afford to do. To pay for increasing numbers of "social" programs, more and more governments resort to the printing press to inflate their currencies or go deeply into debt (which amounts to the same thing). Governments try to blame others for a phenomenon for which they themselves are chiefly responsible; thus we hear governments denouncing greedy unions for raising wages or greedy businessmen for raising prices. Evans shows us government itself is the real culprit with its secret and unvoted tax of inflation.

In the best tradition of enlightened conservatism, Evans urges a balanced and prudent approach to the perennial problems of the rights of the indi-

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vidual vs the rights of society as a whole. He upholds the right of each state to impose community standards to limit the spread of pornography and to keep it within reasonable bounds. He defends the right of free speech except where the exercise of such right presents a clear and present danger to the stability of society and the safety of individuals.

Evans also reveals how government which tries to do too many things ends up not performing adequately its primary responsibilities: the maintenance of a strong national defense and the protection of lives and property.

The book as a whole is a useful guide to reasoned conservative arguments on the major outstanding questions of our political life. Hopefully, it will be used widely (along with books giving the liberal point of view) as supplementary reading in college courses on American government.

While Stanton Evans has written a wide-ranging philosophical treatise on contemporary American conservatism, Congresswoman Marjorie Holt of Maryland has performed an equally important service by bringing together the ideas of eighteen of her colleagues who are on the firing line in the U.S. House of Representatives.

The Case Against the Reckless Congress represents the distilled experience of the leaders of the Republican Study Committee, a group of Conservative Republican Congressmen who banded together in 1973 in order to advance the cause of constitutional government, free, competitive enterprise and a strong national defense in the U.S. Congress.

Each of the authors has spent considerable time working on the public issue discussed in his chapter. Congressman Sam Steiger of Arizona, for instance, has done his best to limit the growth of bureaucracy and make it more responsible to the people. Congressman John Rousselot of California has taken the lead in fighting for a balanced budget and an end to deficit financing. Congressman Jack Kemp of New York has introduced a comprehensive Jobs Creation Bill which would reduce unemployment by encouraging capital accumulation and the growth of private sector jobs.

Congressman William Armstrong of Colorado has put the case well for a rational energy policy that would free us from dependence upon foreign oil and avoid the problems of rationing. Congressman William Ketchum of California has worked hard to reform the regulatory agencies, which according to President Ford, have the net effect of reducing by about $2000 a year the income of the average American. Congressman Robin Beard of Tennessee has introduced an Occupational Safety and Health Administration reform bill which would protect the safety of workers while not driving small businesses out of existence. The constitutional right of Americans to keep

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and bear arms is ably defended by Congressman William Goodling of Pennsylvania. The Ranking Republican member of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, Congressman Edward J. Derwinski of Illinois, one of the ablest parliamentarians in the Congress, discusses the evils of the current attempt to repeal the Hatch Act and allow civil servants to actively participate in politics. Mr. Derwinski has only recently been successful in leading the fight to uphold the President's veto of this bill which would have led to a new spoils system.

Four Representatives who have been active in the reform of many of our social services (which have often hurt the very people they were designed to help) give us the benefit of their experience. Congressman Philip Crane of Illinois (a former professor and now a leading activist-intellectual) refutes many of the allegations against the American medical system and tells us why socialized medicine in this country is not likely to work any better than it has in Europe . . . which is not very well. Congressman Clair Burgener of California, who was very instrumental in shaping Governor Reagan's welfare reform plan in that state, discusses with considerable authority the extent of the welfare problem and the prospects for improvement. Food stamps have multiplied far beyond the intent of the original law to the point where a quarter of all Americans are now eligible for food stamps; Congressman William Dickinson of Alabama brings his considerable expertise to bear on this growing problem. The Social Security system is rapidly approaching the point where taxes cannot be raised high enough to pay for expanding benefits and Congressman Barry Goldwater, Jr. of California contributes some helpful suggestions for restoring the fiscal integrity of the world's largest pension plan.

Congressman Robert Bauman of Maryland is one of the youngest Members of the House but is already among the most effective. By making use of his knowledge of parliamentary procedure and sticking doggedly on the floor he has managed to stop innumerable proposals to waste the taxpayer's money. He writes about one of the more blatant areas of waste, the federal grants to the arts and sciences. Congressman Thomas Hagedorn of Minnesota contributes a thoughtful chapter on the necessity to balance environmental concerns with the needs of the economy. A young Congressman from Mississippi, Trent Lott, a veteran of the House Judiciary Committee advocates giving first priority to the victims and potential victims of crime rather than to protecting criminals. The most articulate libertarian in the Congress is undoubtedly Congressman Steve Symms of Idaho, a young apple-farmer and economist who was elected on the slogan "Let's Take A Bite Out

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of Government." He exposes the growing federal regimentation of the schools, both public and private.

National security issues comprise the last section of this well-documented book. Congressman David Treen of Louisiana outlines a foreign policy which will place the just interests of the United States first on our agenda while a veteran member of the Armed Services Committee, Congressman Floyd Spence of South Carolina, gives facts and figures to back up his assertion that the United States, if present trends continue, is in real danger of falling behind the Soviet Union in the military balance.

The Case Against the Reckless Congress deserves to be widely read; in 248 pages it amounts to a thorough indictment of the failures of liberalism in recent years. Congresswoman Holt and her colleagues have marshalled fact after fact to present an iron-clad case for a revival of conservatism as a driving force in American life.

PEARSON, ROGER (editor)
Korea In The World Today
Council on American Affairs, Wash. D.C., 109 pp., $5.00, 1976.
CLOUGH, RALPH N.
Deterrence and Defense in Korea
The Brookings Institution, Wash. D.C., 1976.

The two books under review here, just recently published, both strongly recommend that the United States retain its troop commitment to South Korea for the foreseeable future. Coming at a time when the voices for disengagement and withdrawal are heard more often, these two volumes are at once timely and authoritative. The Pearson volume contains nine articles by specialists on US foreign and defense policies, including Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah) and Representative John M. Murphy (D-New York), two U.S. legislators with defense expertise and past military experience in Korea itself. Ralph Clough is a consultant with the Brookings Institution and has written two previous books on U.S. foreign policy in Asia. Taken together, the two books present scholarly and articulate viewpoints on the necessity for a continued American military presence in South Korea. By the weight of their combined arguments they should go far toward dispelling the illusion that the United States, having lost in Vietnam, can conveniently pack up and leave the rest of the Asian world to the next most powerful bidder.

Korea in the World Today has three articles addressed exclusively to the

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defense question. One deals with the military balance between the two Koreas, another describes South Korea's role in the Northeast Asian balance of power while the third (by Congressman Murphy) analyzes the military preparedness of the Republic. The Clough book is one in a series of Brookings studies on defense issues, and examines in detail the political and military problems of South Korea for the short, medium and long terms. Clough, who is also a Professor of international relations at American University , concludes that an immediate withdrawal of American forces would serve no interest except North Korea's. Because the consequences of a renewed conflict in Korea would be so serious, he notes, the United States should avoid taking any action (such as withdrawal) that might weaken the deterrent against an attack from the North. In the short run, Clough supports the presence of an American military force sufficient to remind North Korea of the dangerous implications of another war. Over the long run, he favors a phased withdrawal, but only under conditions that would absolutely guarantee the continued preservation of the integrity and security of the south. Tension between the North and the South, he writes, can only be lessened if Kim Il-Sung becomes convinced that his current hard-line policy cannot succeed. That can only come about, Clough believes, through a patient and resolute demonstration of American and South Korean will and through a step-by-step establishment of genuine relations between North and South. Such a change cannot be expected soon, hence the United States must have a policy concerning its forces in South Korea that will be tenable for a number of years: no withdrawals for the immediate future, and possible phased withdrawals only after substantial political progress has been worked out between Seoul and Pyongyang.

The authors of the Pearson study are in substantial agreement with Clough's assessment. The commitment to the presence of U.S. forces for the near future weaves through all of the articles. In some cases it is stated explicitly. Congressman Murphy (himself a Korean War veteran), for example, writes that the United States cannot leave the ROK under the existing circumstances and, for the future, the United States must bring the ROK army to parity with the North Korean armed forces in terms of sophisticated weapons and weapons systems. When parity is reached, he maintains, the United States will have to carefully watch and react appropriately to any further escalation of arms in the North, whether it comes internally or from outside. Senator Garn, in his article entitled "Conclusions and Recommendations for the Future," warns specifically against the possibility of another attack from the North, especially in light of the recent border incidents and

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the military tunnels that the North has been digging under the Demilitarized Zone. Senator Garn has inspected these tunnels himself and has concluded with a message that should serve as a sober reminder to all those who have, in the past, dismissed the possibility of another Korean War. "I earnestly hope," the Senator wrote, "that the United States Congress will learn from history and will steadfastly support policies which will avoid a repetition of the devastating 1950-53 war that cost the people of both Koreas immense suffering and that cost the United States 53,000 men . . . . the best way of avoiding a war in Korea or anywhere else is by being prepared . . . better prepared than any potential aggressor."

Although a majority of the articles in Pearson's book are concerned with security issues, a number of them address other topics of importance to readers interested in Korean affairs. There is an analysis of the Korean economy, for instance, which points out how the South Koreans have achieved their own economic "miracle" over the past few years. If South Korea continues her spectacular growth and becomes less dependent upon foreign imports and capital, she may become, within two decades, one of the richest Asian nations. Another article deals with Korea's role in world history, while still a third analyzes the political situation that South Korea faces in an increasingly hostile United Nations. Finally, there is a selection which confronts openly the difficult and complicated issue of human rights and democracy as they exist in the government of Park Chung Hee. Taking into consideration Korea's history plus the existence on South Korea's border of an enemy military force, the article concludes that the range of opportunities for dissent and the degree of political liberty are actually much broader than would be expected from a reading of the diatribes against South Korea that have become fashionable in some U.S. journalistic circles. Certainly, as is the case of other nations that have been divided between communist and non-communist governments, there is absolutely no comparison in the field of human rights and the development and potential for the growth of political liberty in the Park government versus the totalitarian regime in the North.

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Stephen Haseler is a member of the Greater London Council; he served as Chairman of the General Purposes Committee but recently resigned because of his belief that London was "going the way of New York City." Active in the right-wing of the Labour Party, Haseler was one of founders of the Social Democratic Alliance. He received the Ph.D. degree from the London School of Economics and lectures in politics at City of London College. He is the author of *The Gaitskellites*, of *Social Democracy – Beyond Revisionism* and of *The Death of British Democracy* which will soon be published in London.

Peter C. Hughes is a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the Catholic University of America, currently employed as Special Assistant to Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (Ind.-Va.) for military and foreign affairs. Mr. Hughes has written widely on U.S. foreign policy, national defense, and other public policy issues. His studies have appeared in, among other publications, *Modern Age, Academic Reviewer, National Review,* and the *Ripon Forum.*

John M. Murphy is a Democratic Congressman from Staten Island, New York. He studied at Amherst College and graduated from West Point, after serving in World War II. During the Korean conflict, he served with distinction in the 9th Infantry Regiment, receiving the Purple Heart, Distinguished Service Cross and other decorations. He was first elected to the 88th Congress in 1962 and is chairman of the Subcommittee on the Panama Canal. Mr. Murphy is head of the Association of Korean War Veterans of the U.S. Congress and is co-author of *Korea in the World Today,* published by the Council on American Affairs.

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